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NOTES
THE STEEL PRODUCTS DECISION: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE TREATMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX UNDER THE COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is not often that one small clause in a tariff act becomes a
major issue between domestic producers and the firms which import competitive foreign goods, a major issue in trade talks between the United States and the European Community, and a
bone of contention between the Congress and the Executive
Branch. Yet, section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 has done just that

and no solution to the issues it has raised is in sight.
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930' is simple enough on its face.
It imposes a countervailing duty on any goods imported into the
United States that have been given a price advantage over domestically produced goods by the payment or bestowal of a direct or
indirect "bounty or grant" by any entity in any country from which
they come or have passed through on their way to the United
States. The imposed countervailing duty equals the payment or
bounty given and is assessed in addition to regular customs duties.
The purpose of section 303 is to neutralize the advantage a
bounty gives a foreigner in the American market. Trouble arises,
however, when one attempts to construct an airtight definition of
what constitutes a grant or bounty. Suppose a government devalues its currency for the sole purpose of giving its manufactured
goods lower prices in the world market. Is that a bounty under
section 303? Suppose a government wishes to channel investment
capital into underdeveloped areas of its country and provides tax
benefits equal to the extra cost of locating a factory in an area
without good roads or available utilities. Would that be a bounty
under section 303? May a government give employees a bonus for
their locating in an unpleasant area which supplements the salary
an exporting corporation pays? May a country remit tariffs on
imported raw materials that are refined or incorporated into a
finished product and then exported to a third country? As if these
questions were not difficult enough to answer, three fairly recent
developments have further complicated the situation.
1.

19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
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First, Congress undertook a major revision of the tariff laws in
the Trade Act of 1974, which included a rewrite of section 303.
Although the Trade Act has a sophisticated and well documented
legislative history, ambiguities remain about what the Congress
intended to do and intended not to do with respect to the countervailing duty.
Secondly, the European Economic Community countries have
substantially changed their systems of taxation over the last decade. The Community is heading toward tax uniformity, and the
primary action its members have taken has been to adopt various
versions of a tax on value-added. (This is called T.V.A. on the
Continent, but because the initials are easily confused with those
of the Tennessee Valley Authority and because the British
anglicized the name to "value-added tax," the tax hereinafter will
be called V.A.T.). According to the Europeans, the V.A.T. is a tax
on consumption, equivalent to a sales tax, and, as with all taxes
on consumption, is not paid in a producing country on goods exported because the goods are not consumed there. If the country
to which the untaxed goods are exported has no value-added tax,
then, aside from any regular tariff, the goods will not be taxed in
the consuming country either.
Thirdly, the United States goods and commodities have come
under increasing foreign trade pressure both at home and abroad.
This pressure has been felt particularly in such heavy industries
as the steel industry. The tonnage of imported steel grew from 1.2
million tons in 1955-about 1.5 per cent of the market-to 10.383
million tons in 1965-about 10.3 per cent of the market. 2 Steel
industry management and labor have been casting about for a way
to increase the price of foreign steel in the United States; and
among other things, they have hit on section 303.
Claiming that goods imported into the United States from countries using V.A.T. are bountified does not make sense unless the
tax systems of the United States and the Community are juxtaposed and their effects examined. To oversimplify for purposes of
introduction, American industry claims that while it must pay the
American corporate income tax, it is forced to compete in the
United States market with foreign manufacturers who either do
2.

From the statement of John P. Roche, President of the American Iron and

Steel Institute before Hearings on Resolution 149 Requesting The President to
Cause a Study of Imports of Steel Mill Products to be Conducted by the Department of Commerce Before the Finance Committee of the Senate, 89th Cong., 2d

Sess. 269 (1966).
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not pay any taxes or have their main tax-V.A.T.-remitted on
export. On the other hand, when the United States manufacturer
sells his goods abroad in a V.A.T. country, his final price includes
both the United States corporate income tax of almost fifty per
cent and the V.A.T. on consumption. Such a situation can put
American manufacturers at a serious disadvantage, as the European Community average "normal" rate of V.A.T. ranges between
3
10 per cent and 23 per cent.
Businessmen often claim they win or lose contracts over a fraction of a percentage point difference in price. The United States
manufacturer would lay out the figures in the following way:
THE IMPACT ON PRICES IN TWO COUNTRIES COLLECTING
THE SAME TAX REVENUES WITH A DIFFERENT
4
TAX MIX
Country A

Country B

$100.00

$100.00

Corporate income tax collected

10.00

2.50

Value-Added Tax collected

-

7.50

Total cost of production
(including return on investment)

Cost of Product to domestic consumer

$110.00

$110.00

Total Tax Collected

$ 10.00

$ 10.00

Export Price

$110.00

$102.50
(minus $7.50
V.A.T.
remitted on
export)

If one assumes that Country A in the chart is the United States,
the export price, $110.00, will also be the domestic sales base price.
If one assumes Country B is an European Community member
assessing no V.A.T. on its exports, then the price of Country B's
product on import to the United States will be lower than the price
of the United States manufacturer's goods in its home market. The
United States manufacturer would contend that the $7.50 difference in export price amounts to a bounty within the meaning of
3.

SCHIFF, VALUE ADDED TAXATION

search Foundation, 1974).
4. Id. at 110.

62, Table II, (Financial Executives Re-
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section 303, and that V.A.T. is not the type of tax that it seems at
first glance.
In Europe, the V.A.T. covers not only steel but most products
in the economy. It substantially affects prices and ultimately jobs.
Pressure has been building in the United States for a confrontation. The primary legal issue is whether the V.A.T. constitutes a
grant or bounty within the meaning of section 303. If it does a
second issue arises; whether the resulting countervailing duty
imposed violates the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
With respect to the first issue, the Department of the Treasury
has recently released an opinion that disagrees with the steel
manufacturers, who want a countervailing duty imposed: "Since
value-added taxes are viewed by the Department as being indirect
taxes directly related to the products upon which they are imposed, the rebate or remission of such taxes upon exportation does
not constitute a bounty or grant."' The second issue was not
reached. The United States Steel Corporation has announced that
it will appeal the Preliminary Negative Determination to the Customs Court.6
This paper will inquire into the Treasury Decision in the following manner. First, the substance and history of section 303 will be
dealt with, with particular attention to the original legislative purpose, the purpose of the 1974 revision, and the enforcement by the
Treasury Department over the years. Secondly, the V.A.T. will be
examined in some detail in order to determine if its characterization and incidence are what they at first seem and to determine
where the tax fits into the GATT. And finally, the Steel Decision
will be examined and conclusions drawn.
II.

THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND rrs ADMINISTRATION

A.

The Original Countervailing Duty and Its Purpose in the
Context of Other Duties
The core section of the countervailing duty law has been on the
statute books since the Tariff Act of 1897.1 It currently is embodied
in section 303(a)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as revised in 1974:8
5. Letter from Assistant Secretary for Tariff Affairs, David R. McDonald, to
M.G. Heatwole, General Counsel to United States Steel Corporation, October 20,
1975.
6. 41 Fed. Reg. 2834 (1976).
7. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 205.

8. Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, ch. 3, § 331(a), 88 Stat.
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Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association,
cartel, or corporation, shallpay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any
grant or bounty upon the manufacture or production or export of
any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of
government, then upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported
directly from the country of production or otherwise, and whether
such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as
when exported from the country of production or has been changed
in condition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied
and paid, in all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise
imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant,

however the same be paid or bestowed. (Emphasis added).
The section is complete. It encompasses every type of bounty,
direct or indirect, by whomever paid. It includes a bounty given
by a country even if the article has passed through numerous other
countries on its way to the United States. It is mandatory in all
cases.
Commentators generally agree that the duty was passed originally for the purpose of protecting domestic interests.' The Congress contemplated retaliation and not the Adam Smith ideal that
"the effect of bounties, like that of all the other expedients of the
mercantile system, can only be to force the trade of a country into
a channel much less advantageous than that in which it normally
would run of its own accord."10 Certainly, the late nineteenth century was a period of high tariffs, and it is in the protectionist
context that the original purpose of the bounty should be viewed.
Indeed, the words "and such article or merchandise is dutiable"
were contained in the law prior to the 1974 revision just before the
words "then upon the importation."'" Congress intended to counteract only those bounties that would breach the United States
tariff wall, and thus non-dutiable goods were not reached by the
1897 Act. Also, no actual distortion of trade had to be found before
the duty went into effect. Whether an injury to domestic producers
2049, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1930).

9. See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty, an Examinationof Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the CountervailingDuty Law, 1 LAw
& POL. ININT'L Bus. 17, 22 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Feller].
10.

A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NATIONS

80 (J. Rogers ed. 1869), as cited in Feller, supra note 9, at n. 11.
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
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had occurred was irrelevant. Once the existence of a bounty was
ascertained, the imposition of the duty was mandatory.'2 The effect of the 1897 law, then, was to protect the domestic trade for the
financial interests politically potent enough to have their products
and commodities shielded by high tariff walls, regardless of any
inflationary effect on the price structure in the United States domestic market. On the other hand, the countervailing duty law did
not shelter those products or commodities that Congress felt did
not need tariff protection, no matter how badly the United States
market was flooded with cheaper bountified goods. Whatever the
precise congressional intent behind the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which became law in the same decade,' 3 the fairer trade contemplated for the domestic market was not extended to international
trade.
There were at least two other duties in the early twentieth century labeled "countervailing" beside the duty imposed on foreign
bountified goods. The only common denominator of all three duties seemed to be retaliation. One responded to foreign tariffs on
petroleum products exported from the United States by ordering
an equal and opposite tariff on the petroleum products exported
to the United States from each country shielding itself from American oil." The other retaliated against any country that put an
export duty on its own wood pulp by placing an import surcharge
equal to the export duty on the pulp's entry into the United States.
The unfortunate pulp importer would be subject to the regular
tariff, plus the exporting country's export duty, plus the American
surcharge." Even the section 303(1) (a) duty was first imposed with
a specific commodity in view-sugar. The 1897 Act took an earlier
countervailing duty on sugar'" and extended protection from bountified imports to all dutiable imports. Thus, any commentator
attempting to read some antitrust rationale into the original coun12.

Feller, supra note 9, at 24.

13. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, (1890) as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).

14. "If there be exported into the United States crude petroleum produced in
any country which imposes a duty on products exported from the United States,
there shall be in such cases levied, paid, and collected a duty upon said crude
petroleum or its products so imported equal to the duty imposed by such country." Tariff Act of 1897, supra note 7, para. 626; see also T.D. 19,263, 1 TREAs.
DEC. 623 (1898) for its practical application.
15. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, §§ 406, 409, 36 Stat. 11; see also T.D. 33,684, 25
TREAS. DEC. 112 (1913) and T.D. 33,786, 25 TREAs. DEC. 248 '(1913) for practical
application.
16. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 584.
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tervailing duty law should look again.' 7 The countervailing duty is
not synonymous with free trade.
A recognition that the original countervailing duty law was not
intended as the antitrust device free-traders would wish it to be,
however, does not prevent its use to enhance free trade today. Prior
to the 1974 revision of the act, those commentators wishing the
countervailing duty law to be an adjunct to the antitrust laws had
split into two schools of thought. The first school viewed the mandatory duty as roughly equivalent to an antitrust tribunal's
unquestioning sanction of a per se violation of the antitrust laws.' 8
The foreign bounty was a practice which the United States would
not allow, a malum per se, from which a distortion of trade would
be implied, regardless of the effect of a particular bounty on the
United States domestic market.'9 The second school would have

added an injury provision to the countervailing duty law, combined it with the Anti-Dumping Act,2" and analogized the combined acts to the anti-price discrimination provision of the Clayton
Act.2 '
The Anti-Dumping Act has often been confused with the countervailing duty law. However, they differ in both purpose and operation. The anti-dumping duty was intended as a weapon to facilitate fair international trade. The Act authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury to investigate any complaint that a foreign country
has been dumping goods into the United States. "Dumping" occurs if goods are sold in the American market for a lower price than
those same goods would bring in their home market. If the Secretary finds that a foreign country has been dumping a product he
17. See, Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination:
United States Countervailingand Anti-dumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 44,
58 (1958).
18. Id. This doctrine, which is not the precise one Ehrenhaft takes, to be
altogether consistent would necessitate extention of the law to non-dutiable imports and abolition of all United States bounties, of which the D.I.S.C. was
merely one. See INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, §§ 991-7, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 501 (1971).
19. "But it does not follow that agreements to fix or maintain prices are
reasonable restraints and permitted by statute merely because the prices themselves are reasonable ....

Agreements with such potential power may well be

in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable." United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, at 396 (1927). The reader should
insert "bounty" for "pricefixing". See also A. NaEA, THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF
THE USA (1970).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
21. Clayton Act, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973).

826

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9." 819

refers that finding to the United States Tariff Commission which
then must determine within three months whether the American

domestic market actually has been injured by the dumping. If the
Tariff Commission determines that an injury has occurred, it levies a duty equal to the difference between the higher price charged
in the home market and the lower United States price.22 Unlike the
countervailing duty law, it is not mandatory unless dumping is
found and there is actual damage to American producers. Thus an
article which has a price at the American domestic price and is sold
here at less than its home market price will not be dutied, because
no injury will have occurred. One commentator favored an extension of the injury requirement to the countervailing duty law, "in
recognition of the fact that American consumers tend to benefit
''
from the availability of subsidized imports at bargain prices."
Both approaches taken to the countervailing duty from an international antitrust perspective are mooted as of this writing as a
result of the extensive revision of the law undertaken by Congress
in 1974. Congress took some of each approach. The two approaches
remain vitally important over the long term, however. As the Earth
shrinks, it is a safe guess that national tariff law and international
trade agreements will become equivalent to a world law of fair
trade; and the same issues that surfaced with respect to the countervailing duty and anti-dumping laws will re-emerge in the world
fair-trade context.
B.

The 1974 Revision of the CountervailingDuty Law and Its
Purpose

Congress revised the countervailing duty law during 1974 in a
way and with an intent relevant to the V.A.T. Perhaps the changes
are summarized best in the Senate Finance Committee Report:
22. See Rein, Legal Remedies Against Unfair Import Competition, 9 LAW
NoTEs (ABA) 45 (1973) for a distillation of the Anti-dumping Act.
23. Feller, supra note 9, at 25. The author also notes at 34 that a nice question exists on "whether those tax remissions on customs drawbacks which would
otherwise be subject to countervailing duties should be handled under the Antidumping Act instead." Thus a remission of drawback which comes under the
jurisdiction of both acts and does not damage American producers would be

subject to a countervailing duty and would not be subjected to any anti-dumping
duty. Should the Anti-dumping Act be allowed to "pre-empt" bountified products when there is "concurrent jurisdiction," no duty could be levied at all. The
1969 revision of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade at Article VI § 5

does, however, ask that both duties not be levied simultaneously.
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The amendments to the existing law adopted by the Committee are
designed to balance the need for assuring effective protection of
domestic interests from foreign subsidies, on the one hand, with the
need to afford some flexibility in the application of United States
law which is essential for achieving a negotiated international agreement to the problems arising from the use of subsidies and imposition of countervailing duties. This flexibility would continuously be
subject to supervision through a one house veto procedure. 4
The Committee felt a need to institute iron-clad procedural reform
in order to regain control over the Treasury Department, which
had administered the old law. In the words of the Committee:
The Committee has been concerned over the past years that the
Treasury has used the absence of time limits to stretch out or even
shelve countervailing duty investigations for reasons which have
nothing to do with the clear and mandatory nature of the countervailing duty law."
The Treasury had not been enforcing the Act vigilantly, and Congress wanted the Act enforced. Yet, Congress realized the issues
that would be raised, should the world's chief trading nation
suddenly begin zealously to enforce her countervailing duty law,
might be difficult to resolve, and it did not want to precipitate a
world-wide trade war in which the United States might be the
biggest loser. The lawmakers were cognizant, also, that there was
as yet no international consensus concerning what constitutes a
fair or unfair subsidy, and that "[i]n the long run, United States
interests [would] best be served by an international agreement to
eliminate subsidies which distort world-wide trade patterns and
discriminate against the United States both at home and
abroad.""6 What Congress did was to write a bill that would both
rein-in the Treasury Department and speed international trade
negotiations.
First, Congress formalized time limits and procedures. Under
the new Act, the Treasury must make a Preliminary Decision
within six months of the receipt of a countervailing duty petition

from an aggrieved United States manufacturer. A Final Duty
Determination is required within another six months.Y In the
past, the Treasury had simply refused to rule on a petition that it
24. S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprintedin (1974) U.S. CONG.
& ADM. NEWS 7186, at 7318. [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
25. Id.
26.

Id.

27.

19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4) (1975).

828

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 9: 819

wanted to avoid. In the news conference on October 20, 1975, announcing the Steel Negative Countervailing Duty Decision, this
colloquy took place:
MEMBER OF THE PRESS: Why did Treasury wait so many
years to make this decision rather quickly, since they had only
gotten the second petition a month or so ago; when there was the
first petition pending since 1968? (That is, the Treasury had received the first steel petition in 1968 and sat on it until mid-1975,
when the petition was withdrawn, see 40 F.R. 23,899, 1975. The
second steel petition went to Treasury in September.)
SECRETARY MACDONALD: Well, the petition of 1968 was
about to be acted upon by the Treasury Department when it was
withdrawn.
MEMBER OF THE PRESS: Why did it wait so many years: Six
or seven years?
SECRETARY MACDONALD: Why did it wait so many years?
You have to ask the people who were around the Treasury Department at that time why they waited so many years. I don't know.2 8
In addition, Congress made mandatory a practice that the
Treasury had inaugurated in 1967; this change being a formal notice and comment procedure 9 with the notice of any formal
investigation pending to be published in the Federal Register. In
order to make the policy of the Treasury Department clearer to
legal practictioners, the Treasury was required to publish all coun3
tervailing duty determinations, whether positive or negative. '
Prior to the 1974 bill, publication of a negative determination had
been a rare event; and while attorneys had some idea what practices would be called bounties, they had no knowledge of what
specific practices had been judged not to be bounties in the past.32
The second major change was an extension of the countervailing
duty law's coverage to non-dutiable goods.13 However, this new
area is administered more like the Anti-Dumping Act than the old
countervailing duty law, which was on dutiable goods alone. The
Treasury Secretary, just as under the prior Act, makes a determi28. Press Briefing by David R. McDonald, Assistant Secretary for
Enforcement Operations and Tariff Affairs on Rejection of Petition in Steel Company Countervailing Duty Cases, Oct. 20, 1975, at 6, Miller-Columbian Reporting
Service 347-0224 (1975).

29. T.D. 67-119, 1 CUST. BULL. 452 (1967).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4) (1975).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(6) (1975).
32. See generally APPENDIX-A, and Feller, supra note 9, at 39.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1975).
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nation as to whether an imported item is being bountified. If it is
not, that is the end of the matter, as under the prior law. However,
if the Secretary determines that a bounty is being granted, the
United States Tariff Commission must determine whether damage
is being inflicted on United States manufacturers before a duty is
imposed. The Tariff Commission has a three month time limit for
its investigations of harm. 4
The third major change made by Congress ameliorates the effect
of the Act's sharper provisions by providing a four year period
during which the Treasury Department may waive imposition of
the duty in order to facilitate negotiations with the country whose
goods are countervailed. 35 The four year period, beginning on
January 3, 1975, is intended also to be used to revise the GATT. 36
Congress remained wary, though, and a countervailing duty may
not be suspended merely on the basis of wishful thinking. Three
requirements must be satisfied: (1) Adequate steps must have
been taken to reduce or to eliminate the adverse effect of the
bounty; (2) there must be a reasonable chance for a successful
resolution of the problem by negotiation; and (3) the failure to
waive the duty during the period of negotiation must be judged
to seriously jeopardize the satisfactory completion of such negotiations. Should the Secretary of the Treasury not find all three circumstances to be present, he must levy the duty immediately.37
Congress still was not satisfied with its ability to control the
Treasury Department. Not only does the Finance Committee Report advise the Treasury to waive only in exceptional circumstances, 38 but the bill itself provides for a legislative veto of any waiver

by a majority vote of the members present and voting in either
9
3
house of Congress.

The Senate Finance Committee went further yet by inserting a
paragraph in its report indicating that it had excluded from the bill
a clause that would have allowed the Secretary of Treasury to
substitute negotiated quotas for a countervailing duty. "The Committee did not want to provide the Executive with the power to
loosen quotas to the point where they are meaningless, and at the
34.

19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1) (1975).

35.

19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2) (1975).

36. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(1) (1975). The GATT will be dealt with later in this
note.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(A), (B), & (C) (1975).
38. Senate Report, supra note 24, at 7322.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(2) (1975).
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same time, not impose 40countervailing duties on subsidized exports
to the United States.
There simply is no way in which the revision of the
countervailing duty law cannot be interpreted as a repudiation of
past Treasury enforcement of the countervailing duty. The bill
amounts to an order to the Treasury to go out and levy countervailing duties. However, the Congress did not take three actions to
limit the Treasury Department that it might have. First, the
Treasury was left with absolute power to determine the amount of
the duty to be levied. This decision is not reviewable by the
courts.4 ' Secondly, the Treasury still has wide discretion over the
determination of what constitutes a bounty. Congress easily could
have created a legislative veto provision covering this. Instead it
chose only to create a veto over decisions by the Department to
waive the duty. And thirdly, the bill does not include a provision
for judicial review of negative duty decisions. The Finance Committee Report did contain such a provision, 42 but the clause must
have been deleted by a conference committee. However, a subsequent court decision has mooted whatever problem this might
have created. 43 Thus, the Treasury still has the same two important powers that it has had since 1897: (1) the power to not find a
bounty; and (2) the power to dilute the effect of its positive determination by levying only a small countervailing duty.

C. What Constitutes a Bounty? The Treasury and Court
Decisions Since 1897 Summarized Into Categories of Subsidy
A reasonably accurate outline of the type of transactions that
will usually result in the assessment of a countervailing duty can
be constructed. The Treasury Department has rarely publicized
40. Senate Report, supra note 24, at 7323.
41. American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
42. Senate Report, supra note 24, at 7320.
43. Section 516(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970) gave

importers the right to protest a duty assessment, but was not so clear on whether
an injured domestic competitor could protest a negative determination. The
Treasury Department succeeded in keeping Hammond Lead Products Company
out of Customs Court on grounds of standing. Hammond had been trying to get

a mandamus writ that would force Treasury to issue a decision. United States v.
Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Three years later,
however, in NationalMilk ProducersFed'n v. Schultz, the District of Columbia
District Court took jurisdiction for so long as the Customs Court refused jurisdiction under the Hammond Doctrine over a countervailing duty determination
appealed by domestic producers. 732 F. Supp. 745 (1974).
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the rationale behind its decisions. Indeed, most of the verbiage in
each Treasury Decision is merely quotation directly from the statute. However, judicial opinions, particularly in the remission-type
cases, serve to fill in most of the gaps.
Not many types of bounty exist. Most of the cases over the years
have fallen into the same fact patterns, and clearly can be labeled
as bounties without Treasury direction. Only the bounty areas of
currency manipulation and tax remission can truly be called complex; but even they fall into patterns, and tend to be factually
rather than conceptually confusing.
1. Direct, Per Unit Subsidies to Exportation.-Outright,direct
and specific subsidies obviously come within the proscribed practices. Perhaps the most blatant case of the direct subsidy on exports is detailed in T.D. 68-192," 4 in which the Treasury levied a
countervailing duty on all French exports entering the United
States equal to 2.5 per cent of the F.O.B. price. The French Government, in order to spur the country's economy after the student
riots of 1968, had decreed certain "temporary" measures under
which all exporters received cash payments for a percentage of
their labor costs. The "temporary" measures are still in effect and
so is the duty.
2. A Direct Subsidy to an Entire Industry, Which Gives a
Benefit to Exports.-A direct subsidy to the whole of a domestic
industry of necessity cannot help but lower export prices for its
product, and therefore, becomes an indirect subsidy of the exported product. T.D. 41,500,11 which ordered the suspension of
the liquidation of duty charges on steel from India, illustrates the
point. India had been giving a cash bounty on the pig-iron ingots
that went into the offending steel ingots, not as an export bounty
but only to encourage production of its own pig iron. "The Department cannot escape the conclusion that the payment of a
bounty on ingots stimulates all processes of manufacture from the
ore to the completed ingot and constitutes an indirect bounty on
pig iron within the meaning of the act."46
Hills Brothers Coffee Co. v. United States47 shows that a direct
subsidy to a product constitutes a bounty and points up the difficulty in splitting up all offending practices into neat categories
44. 2 CUST. BULL. 409 (1968).
45. 49 TREAS. DEC. 694 (1926). India repealed her subsidy shortly thereafter;
see T.D. 42,161, 51 TREAs. DEC. 667 (1927).
46. Id.
47. 107 F. 107 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901).
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when they are in the context of a whole tax program. In Hills
Brothers, the Treasury Department assessed a countervailing duty
on Dutch sugar. At that time, all domestic and imported sugar sold
in Holland was subject to an excise levy of 27 florins per 100 kilos.
Sugar grown in Holland and processed there entitled the people

handling it to a sugar credit or deduction worth 2.38 florins per 100
kilos, or roughly one tenth of the excise levy. In addition, excise
tax credit of 27 florins per 100 kilos was given on sugar exported,
since the tax was an excise on consumption, and the sugar exported was not consumed in Holland. Thus, a Dutch sugar
grower/refiner could export all of his production, use his export
credits against his excise bill to pay no excise, yet still be entitled
to a credit worth one-tenth of the excise tax per 100 kilos on all the
sugar he grew. That one-tenth was held to be an export bounty.
The Court commented: "Undoubtedly, this premium or
'deduction' is called a bounty on production; but the other provisions of the law have the practical effect of making it, from the
standpoint of other countries, a bounty on exportation." 8
3. Government Conferred Benefits Equivalent to Cash Subsidies.-Government benefits which are the equivalent of cash subsidies can either be tied directly to the individual export unit, as
in item one above, or support the whole of an industry, as in item
two above. Both practices will result in a countervailing duty. For
instance, in 41 Fed. Reg. 1298,11 the South African ferrochrome
manufacturers were investigated by the Treasury Department and
found not to be getting concessionary harbor fees. A reduced harbor fee would have helped only exported ferrochrome, and would
have been considered a direct bounty. On the other hand, the
ferrochrome makers were found to be receiving reduced electricity
rates, preferential financing, and concessionary rail xates. Such

subsidies tended to aid the South African ferrochrome industry as
a whole and would have been considered indirect bounties on exportation had they not been stopped shortly before the Final Countervailing Duty Decision.
4. Indemnification for Export Losses.-Any indemnification
for export losses constitutes a bounty under section 303. An example is given by a recent decision:
In accordance with section 303, the net amount of the bounties or
grants has been ascertained and determined, or estimated to be the
48. Id. at 108.
49.

See also, 40 Fed. Reg. 34423 (1975).
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amounts of the deficiency payments made at the end of each fiscal
year by the Swiss Government to the Swiss Cheese Union to compensate for losses incurred in marketing Emmenthaler and Gruyere
cheese in both domestic and export markets.'
5. Commodity Support Prices.-A commodity price support
paid by a government to its growers when the world price goes
below a domestically set parity level amounts to a direct cash
subsidy to the whole industry. The subsidy inevitably gives the
subsidized growers an advantage over foreign unsubsidized growers. Australian sugar has been subject to a countervailing duty for
over twenty-five years, ever since the world price dipped below the
support parity in 1958."1 The countervailing duty has fluctuated
with the world price.
6. Unequal Bartering.-Any type of barter transaction in
which commodities are exchanged at premium prices will be la-

beled a dutiable transaction if such transaction is equivalent to a
bounty on exports to the United States. In 1939, it appears that
the Treasury Department received information convincing it that
the strategic commodities of copper and cotton were being bought
by the Germans by barter, and that the American importers were
getting too good a deal for the transactions to be entirely what they
seemed. The excess profit, judged by the prevailing market prices,
was held to be a bounty. 2 Such transactions illustrate the weakness of United States import laws when applied to totalitarian
countries. Communist state trading companies, like the German
traders above, often set arbitrary and unrealistically low prices.
Because there are no books to examine, the Treasury has a difficult
time not setting a countervailing duty that is equally arbitrary.
There may be depths to the German precedent that injured Ameri53
can manufacturers have yet to explore.
7. Currency Manipulation and the Use of Multiple Rates of
Exchange.-Currencymanipulation used by a foreign government
to promote the export of certain of its products will cause the
50.

T.D. 76-5, 10 CUST. BULL.

-

(1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 1467, (1976). T.D. 76-

6 waived the duty. 10 CUST. BULL. - 41 Fed. Reg. 1467, (1976).
51. T.D. 54,719, 93 TREAS. DEC. 500 (1958).
52. T.D. 49,821, 74 TREAS. DEC. 389 (1939).

53.

It is common knowledge that many communist countries also set low

prices on their wares both to buy strategic commodities and to acquire needed
foreign exchange. Whether or not the goods are bartered, this writer has seen no

cases challenging the low prices under the countervailing duty law. If on appeal
a court found a subsidy, the mandatory nature of the law would force the Treasury
to liquidate a countervailing duty.
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Treasury to assess a countervailing duty equal to the manipulation. In the early 1930's, the German Government established two
classes of marks that could be held by foreigners; "free" Inarks,
and registered marks. Free marks could be bought only at the
official rate of exchange (approximately $.40/mark), and were
freely alienable within Germany. Registered marks could be transferred only within Germany and only with prior government approval, and as a result were worth approximately one-half the
value of free marks to foreigners. Thus, if al importer bought a
quantity of registered marks, as from another foreign holder, and
used those marks to make payment to a German exporter, the
''real" cost of that transaction to the importer would be less than
the nominal price of the goods by the difference between the market value of the registered marks and the value of that number of
marks at the official exchange rate. Since the exporter could con-

vert registered marks into an equal number of free marks, that
difference amounted to an export subsidy paid by the German
Government. 5 Such imports were subjected to countervailing duties under section 303.-5
Uruguay used a simpler technique to promote exports. It set
different official exchange rates for different types of transactions.
The country particularly wanted to sell combed wool tops, so it set
the exchange rate for wool-top transactions at (for purposes of
illustration) two pesos bought for one dollar. The other exchange
rates all made pesos more expensive. The Treasury Department,
unable to determine what the one "real" exchange rate should be,
decided that a weighted average based on the previous year's official currency transaction should be the rate. It called the difference
between the combined rate and the wool-top rate a bounty. In
Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States,5" the Treasury lost its
case, ostensibly because the weighted average technique was statistically invalid and inaccurate for the year in which the countervailing duty was assessed. While the "real" exchange rate may be
difficult to determine and therefore the duty more difficult to liquidate than in the Woolworth case, the judges may have been influenced by the fact that Uruguay is a developing country, the currency of which, at the time of the disputed transaction, had a black
market exchange rate of over three pesos to the dollar. If the unoffi54. Feller, supra note 9, at 47.

55. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A. 1940);
T.D. 49,878, 74 TEAs. DEC. 475 (1939).
56. 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966).
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cial rate is taken as the "true" value of the currency, then the price
paid for wool-tops by the importer was something of a premium,
and not a subsidy at all.
The Energetic Worsted case probably is as far as the Treasury
will want to take the exchange rate problem under the countervailing duty law. Determining the "real" exchange rate of currencies
was difficult enough under the Bretton Woods system of official
fixed rates. Calculations would become surreal if the department
tried to liquidate the amount of countervailing duty to be assessed
in this day of the "Snake" and the "dirty float."
8. Tax Reductions Intended to EncourageEconomic Development.-Whether a foreign government may give tax concessions
for the purpose of promoting development in high unemployment

areas without the imposition of a countervailing duty on the import of the promoted product into the United States depends upon
the particular circumstances of each case. In T.D. 73-10,5 7 the
Treasury assessed a countervailing duty on Michelin X-Radials
imported from Canada equal to what it felt was the net effect of a
bounty bestowed by way of: (1) a special accelerated depreciation
provision under Canadian income tax law; (2) a low interest loan
from the Province of Nova Scotia; and (3) reduced property tax
assessments by local municipalities.
Thus the government apparently (a) disbelieved Michelin's contention that this aspect of the large Canadian subsidy program was
aimed chiefly at luring business and industry into high unemployment and underdeveloped areas of the country, or (b) felt the domestic effect of the subsidies was secondary to the effect upon exportation, or (c) felt the domestic effect or purpose was irrelevant if it
also had a substantial effect upon exportation. 8
Seventy-five per cent of the Canadian concern's production was
shipped to the United States market.
On the other hand, the Treasury did not choose to call almost
precisely the same tax benefits given to float glass production in
Belgium and Germany bounties under the countervailing duty
law. 9 The department noted that almost none of the float glass
found its way into the United States markets, and that less than
two per cent of the product value was affected by the subsidies.
Cynics might infer the decisions were determined not on the merits
57.
58.
59.

7 CUST. BULL. 11 (1973).
Comment, 8 TEx. INT'L L.J. 437-39 (1973).
41 Fed. Reg. 1298, 1299 (1976).
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but on the relative political influence of the nations involved,
especially as Italy's float glass was held to be within section 303
and assessed a countervailing duty on the same day." However,
such a conclusion probably would be unfair. The department
would seem to have developed a sliding scale with regard to such
indirect bountification of products manufactured in less developed
areas. Italian float glass was assessed a ten per cent ad valorem
duty. Michelin X-Radials were finally assessed at 6.6 per cent.
German float glass was held not to be bounty-fed, when, had the
decision gone the other way, it could have been assessed only a two
per cent duty. How the Treasury uses its discretion in a case in
which the bounty lies in the two to 6.6 per cent range probably
depends as much on the skill of the lawyer litigating the issue as

any other factor. Indeed, a skilled litigator for American manufacturers might succeed even in having the float glass cases reversed
on an ultra vires theory, for section 303 is mandatory and makes
no discretionary exceptions for bounties to poor areas.
9. Over-Remission of Customs Duties when the Product is
Exported: Excise Class, but Non-Sales Excise.-When a country
remits on re-exportation more than the original tariff that was
collected on a product's importation, that excess is classed as a
bounty. In Gray v. United States,62 raw silk had been imported into
Great Britain. It was charged a tariff upon its entry at a certain
rate per pound. Once in Britain, the raw silk was processed for reexport to the United States. However, at that time, during processing of a pound of silk an amount of waste material was created.
Some of this waste could be sold as a by-product, but the remainder had to be junked. Britain "drewback" all of the tariff paid by
the silk manufacturer on importation when the finished product
was re-exported to the United States, except that paid on the
poundage that the manufacturer had sold in Britain as byproduct. The British exporter got back his original import duty
even for the wastage that had been junked. This remission of tariff
on the junked waste was held to be a bounty on exported silk. The
silk manufacturer was getting a rebate on more poundage than he
was exporting; something that his American competitors would
not get if they had wished to re-export silk products, and something that the British silk manufacturer would not get if he sold
his finished product at home.
60. T.D. 76-9, 10 CUST. BULL. - (1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 1274 (1976).
61. T.D. 74-254, 8 CUST. BULL. 490 (1964).
62.

T.D. 48,679, 69 TREAS. DEC. 811 (Cust. Ct. 1936).
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Allowing a non-excessive drawback makes perfect sense. Otherwise a product that went through several countries on its way to a
final retail market would have the cost of each new tariff added to
its base price. The product would be virtually unsalable at such a
price; and international trade would be discouraged because of the
multiple taxation. However, in Gray, the British chose a method

that the courts term indirect63 to divert a traffic in silk, which
otherwise might have gone through other countries. The legitimate
nature of most of the drawback should not obscure what was done.
A direct bounty to the export of silk products was disguised in the
drawback mechanism. Britain paid her silk manufacturers the
equivalent of what they normally would have lost to the trash heap
to process their product in Britain. The over-drawback is merely a
camouflaged form of the first type of subsidy mentioned above,
direct, per unit subsidies to exportation.
10. Any Remission of Indirect Taxes Not Related Directly to
the ProductExported. Excise Class, but Tax Occulte.-The Treasury Department will not allow a foreign government to rebate any
of its internal taxes when such rebate amounts to a direct subsidy
on the whole of the foreign industry. In American Express Co. v.
United States,6 4 the Treasury Department was upheld by the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals in its assessment of a countervailing duty on structural steel towers for rebated Italian tax occulte,
or "hidden taxes." There, the Italian Government had remitted
what it termed "Basic Rate Taxes," which included overhead
itemssuch as registration taxes, stamp taxes, transportation docunmnts taxes, insurance taxes, and mortgage taxes. Such taxes are
excises, but are to be distinguished from a tariff, also an excise,
and particularly from a sales or use or manufacturing tax, all three
of which are excises that are tied directly to the number of units
sold.
Undoubtedly the rule stated by the American Express Court was
and is the correct one under the current countervailing duty law.
"[T]he remission, rebate, refund, abatement, however accomplished, of taxes which are not directly related to the exported
product or of the raw materials or components used therein" are
63. All remissions are labeled indirect subsidies. Though they pass directly
from the government to a manufacturer, the duty has been bestowed indirectly
because it follows a tax payment from the manufacturer to the government. There

have been two steps, thus the courts refer to direction and not effect when they
call remissions indirect bounties. See note 88 infra.
64. 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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grants or bounties under section 303. Apparently, once a country
makes the decision to tax, it may not selectively remit the tax even
partially to a certain industry without having that industry's
products countervailed on their export from that country to the
United States. Such a remission would amount to a direct subsidy
to the whole of that industry relative to those industries in the
foreign country which did not get their tax occulte remitted. In
other words, a direct subsidy to the whole of an industry, although
cloaked in the remission process, is a subsidy all the same.
Aside from the obvious clash with the German and Dutch Float
Glass cases, which were mentioned above,65 the American Express
case has created problems by misstating the rationale underlying
the rule which it upheld. What the Customs Court did was to cite
a European Community Court decision concerning precisely the
same tax occulte,6" and use that Court's rationale. The European
Court decision of Re Drawback on Italian Machine Parts7 was
based on an interpretation of article 96 of the Treaty of Rome, 8
which provides that products exported to a member state may "not
benefit from any drawback of internal charges in excess of those
charges imposed. . .on them." The decision and the article reflect
a Community policy allowing the remission on export of taxes on
consumption, as opposed to taxes such as tax occulte. The tax
concessions given in order to encourage development of depressed
regions of the Community are specifically negotiated exceptions
to article 96, and are designed to give equal economic opportunity
to all regions in the E.E.C. The Community Court decision not to
allow remission of tax occulte is thus an arbitrary one taken in the
light of the knowledge that depressed regions already are getting
help and that the Community favors the more easily calculated
Border Tax Adjustments, made after remission of taxes on consumption, over the more difficult to allocate remission of indirect
taxes not directly related to the unit cost of each subsidized product.,9
65. See note 59 supra.
66. 11 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour (Cour de Justice de la Communaut6 Europ6ene) 1057, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8038, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 97
(1966).
67. Id.
68. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), March
25, 1957. The authoritative English text of the treaty may be found in TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Office of Official Publications of the

European Communities, 1973). An unofficial English text may be found in 298

U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
69. This will be dealt with at length in subsection 12.
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Community law is interesting, but it has nothing directly to do
with the American Countervailing Duty Law. The countervailing
duty on each bountified unit from Italy was no more difficult to
calculate than the direct subsidy on each unit of Indian steel exported to the United States,'7 or the de minimus effect of tax
concessions by Germany and Belgium to their float glass manufacturers. 71 Worse yet, the American Express decision expressly formulated the corollary to article 9672 that if remission of taxes not
directly related to the article exported will not be allowed, then the
remission of taxes directly related to the article exported will be
allowed. 7 As will be made more clear later, in the European mind
the tax to which the product is directly related is the V.A.T., and
in terms of section 303, that corollary applied to the V.A.T. is not

necessarily valid.
11. Any Remission of Corporate Income Tax, at Least When
the Remission of Such Tax is Not For the Purpose of Aiding an
Underdeveloped Area. Direct Class, Unrelated Directly to Exports.-When a corporate income tax remission has not been
given to all corporations, any favoritism as to one segement of industry must inevitably result in a bounty. The tax remission would
amount to a direct subsidy to the industry receiving the remission
relative as compared to those industries in the foreign country that
did not get their corporate income taxes rebated. No cases have
been found directly on point in this area, probably because it is so
obvious. If one looks beneath the surface at the whole tax concession area, however, firm conclusions as to bounties are difficult to
make. For instance, is oil coming into the United States from
abroad that has been exported by companies able to take a perpetual percentage depletion allowance bounty-fed as against American oil which no longer receives a percentage of depletion allowance?
12. Any Remission of such Excises as are Directly Related to
the Exported Product. Turnover Taxes.-No conflict exists over
the question of whether the over-remissionof a sales, use, or manufacturing tax measured by gross income constitutes a bounty; it
does. It is the question of whether the remission of only so much
of the excises as have already been paid when the product is ex70.
71.

See note 45 supra.
See note 59 supra.

72. See note 68 supra.
73. 472 F.2d at 1058. The Court previously had stated its precise holding; thus
its statement on turnover taxes is dicta.
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ported constitutes a bounty that causes difficulty. The difficulty
is extreme, because it brings into question the correctness of the
assumptions implicit in the very words used to describe and classify a tax.
Under classical theory:
[taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is
demanded from the very persons, who it is intended or desired,
should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one
person in the expectation that he shall indemnify7 himself at the
expense of another, such as the excise or customs.
In other words, when a legislature passes an indirect tax, it expects
the person collecting the tax to add the appropriate amount to the

selling price, shifting the burden or incidence of the tax to the
vendee. When a legislature passes a tax on consumption, the party
on whom the incidence finally is shifted is the retail buyer. Thus
an indirect tax is directly related to the dollar volume of products
sold.75
When a legislature passes a direct tax, it does not expect the
vendor to shift the tax, but to pay it out of his own net profits. If
the vendor tries to shift an income tax, the most widely collected
direct tax, he cannot accurately predict how much to raise his price
on each unit of product he sells, for net profit bears only an indirect
relation to gross profit or sales. Thus a direct tax has only an
indirect relationship with the product sold.7 6
Though the foregoing is a semantic nightmare, it is one way to
describe what obviously are two different kinds of taxation. The
direct/indirect way of describing taxes works perfectly well so long
as one deals only with one country. However, the shift in incidence
assumed for the indirect tax necessarily carried certain consequences when placed in an import/export context, particularly if
the legislature has intended the tax to be on domestic consumption. If the product is exported instead of consumed in the home
country, then the taxable event-domestic consumption-never
takes place, and no tax should be collected on the exported product, In practice, this is a two step transaction. First, the taxpayer
pays the government a percentage of his gross income, derived
74.

J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONoMY 823 (Ashley ed. 1936) as cited
STATE AND LOCAL TAX 25 (1969) with other definitional and
background material.
75, K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 124

in J.

HELLERSTEIN,

(1970) [hereinafter cited as DAM].
76. Id.
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from both exports and products sold domestically. Then he totals
his net exports and presents the total to the government, which
will either remit cash to him or credit the total toward a reduction
in his future consumption tax. As has been noted in the previous
sections,7 7 remission of direct tax may constitute a subsidy.
The products of two countries, one of which taxes directly and
the other of which taxes indirectly, should be able to compete on
an equal basis in the marketplace if the respective shifting and

nonshifting of the taxes actually happens as it is supposed to in
theory, assuming all other costs are equal. Since the cost of neither
country's exports would include taxes, prices should be the same.
The direct taxing country's corporation would use net profits to
pay the tax, and the indirect taxing country's corporation would
never even incur a consumption tax.78
In practice, however, the actual effect of the respective taxes has
not conformed with what one would expect in theory. Instead, the
businessman in the direct taxing country shifts whatever tax burden he can to the consumer, just as does the vendor in the indirect
tax state. Businessmen almost uniformly assert that they shift as
much of the tax burden forward as they can, as swiftly as they can.
To the extent that he can, a manufacturer plans to make a certain
percentage of after-tax profit. If he does not, investors soon will
take their money to where it will make a satisfactory percentage
return on their investment. Thus, when a business income tax
increase cuts into profits, prices will soon rise to restore those profits.7 9
Admittedly, the amount which a businessman must raise his
prices to restore a planned profit level after an income tax increase
takes quite a lot of calculation. However, the corporate income tax
is not graduated but proportional. It can be described as a proportional excise tax on profits."' The other non-tariff type of excise not
directly related to the gross sales of a product is the tax occulte;

and its remission on export results in the assessment of a countervailing duty on entry into the American market. Certainly a businessman will have no more difficulty in calculating the per unit
77.
78.

See note 44 supra.
McClure, The Value Added Tax: Pros and Cons, in C. MCCLURE & N.
TURE, VALUE ADDED TAX, TWO VIEWS 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McClure].
79. No citation here. Personal experience.
80. Ture, Economics of the Value Added Tax, in C. MCCLURE & N. TURE,
VALUE ADDED TAX, Two VIEWS 80 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ture]. Mr. Ture
may have taken his argument further than he had to in Senate Finance Committee Hearings before passage of the 1974 Trade Act. His testimony makes lively
reading.

842

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9: 819

cost increase after an income tax rise than the Treasury Department had in calculating the per unit bounty given to the Italian
manufacturer in the American Express case. The extent to which
the income tax is shifted forward by price increases has by no
means been settled by the economists. However, there is little
8
doubt that some shifting takes place. '

Little doubt exists that the converse is also true to some extent.
A manufacturer in an indirectly taxing country has to swallow a
consumption tax increase to the extent his net profits drop on
account of decreased aggregate demand by his country's consumers for the more costly product. The profit drop will be a function
of the domestic elasticity of demand over the short and long term.
For example, a sales tax increase on oil can be passed along more
easily and with less of a drop in demand than a sales tax increase
on chocolate. In either case, however, the slack in domestic demand can be taken up by increased sales in the export market,
where the consumption tax increase has no effect. Unless they wish
to shrink their labor force, management will feel increased pressure
to export.2
If all nations taxed manufacturers directly, i.e. taxes at the point
of origin, and did not tax consumption, then no remissions could
ever be made on exportation. No product price could ever include
both an income tax at the point of origin and a consumption tax
at its destination. There would be no chance of double taxation.
Conversely, no double taxation would occur if all nations taxed
only at the destination. However, such uniformity does not exist.
The direct and indirect methods of taxation collide when it is
recognized that the incidence of the income tax is shifted forward
to the consumer.
This collision between tax structures becomes apparent when
one takes three imaginary countries with different tax structures
and analyzes the possible trade relations among them. First, assume Country A makes one product, widgets, and collects an income tax from its one manufacturing company of $1 million. Secondly, assume Country B also makes widgets, and collects $1 mil-

lion in indirect taxes from widgets consumed domestically. Then
assume Country C has neither widget manufacturers nor a con81. Messere, Border Tax Adjustments, as reprinted in, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Tariff and Trade Proposals of the House Ways and Means
Committee, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., Part 1 at 73 (1968), [hereinafter cited as 1968
Ways and Means Hearings].
82. Ture, supra note 80, at 78.
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sumption tax. The following three situations are possible. First,
when the widget manufacturers in Country A sell their product to
Country C, the cost will include the shifted income tax. When the
manufacturers in Country B sell their widgets to Country C they
need not include any tax cost in the price of their product, as the
taxable event of consumption will not have occurred in Country B.
All other things being equal, the widgets not burdened by any tax
will have the advantage. Second, when a manufacturer in Country
A tries to sell its products in Country B, not only do its widgets'
price include the income tax from the point of origin, but Country

B's consumption tax is included as well. Of course, Country B's
manufacturers also collect the consumption tax, but their widgets'
cost does not include the cost of any income tax. Third, when the
manufacturers of Country B sell their widgets in Country A, they
pay no consumption tax on exported goods and they can arrange
the distribution so that they pay no income tax, either. 3
Economists must answer how the three country trading area
eventually will reach equilibrium. But over the short-run, the
country which is dependent on the income or other direct tax will
be at a distinct disadvantage relative to the country using the
indirect tax.
To recapitulate, two positions may be taken on the question of
whether or not a turnover tax measured by gross income should be
characterized as a bounty. The position taken is dependent on
whether or not one espouses the traditional view that the income
tax is not shifted forward, or looks to the marketplace for the empirical effects. The Treasury Department has taken the traditional approach, and it will not assess a countervailing duty be84
cause of a rebate of indirect taxes.
Whatever the Treasury Department's stated policy today, the
early court cases clearly held that the remission of an excise tax
directly related to the goods taxed was a bounty when such remission amounted to the setting of two price structures, one for the
domestic market in the exporting country and another lesser price
for the export market. A related line of case law distinguished
when a remission of excise would establish two price structures and
when it would not. Indeed, anyone reading the cases cannot help

but be struck by the sophistication of the early decisions, some of
83. The distributor will pay a tax, but not the foreign vendor, if he arranges
the transaction properly.
84. A reading of the years of 1975 and 1976 in APPENDIX A shows several
decisions concerning indirect taxes which foreshadow the Steel Productsdecision.
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which dealt with extraordinarily complex fact situations. Nothing
in the countervailing duty area today would surprise those earlier
jurists.
The first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with the countervailing duty was its most difficult. In Downs v. United States, 5
the Court upheld the assessment of a countervailing duty on imported Russian sugar. The Russian sugar control system was extremely complex, and if one wishes to understand the minutiae of
what was done, one must go to the case. The Russian Government
had constructed a system of three classes of sugar: one class that
could be sold in Russia at a set price plus an excise equal to the
value of the sugar; another class held in reserve, which could be
used to augment supply in the domestic market in case prices rose

too high; and a third class of sugar that could be exported without
the payment of any excise, but that would pay a double excise duty
if it were sold on the Russian home market. As all the sugar stored
in warehouses had been pre-taxed, 6 a trader withdrawing sugar for
exportation would receive a refund certificate entitling him to a
credit for the needless pre-payment of the excise. In addition, negotiable certificates representing warehoused and classed sugar
were traded freely between sugar merchants. By trading, a coastal
sugar merchant could turn all his sugar into exportable sugar,
while the interior merchant would acquire certificates allowing
him to market all his sugar domestically without paying the double
excise on his third class of sugar (which by his trading he had
transformed into sugar of the first class). Since sugar is sugar by
whatever class called, the certificates and not the sugar moved
through the channels of the trade. (This trading of sugar certificates somewhat resembled the trading of gold certificates by governments during the days of the gold currency standard, in which
the certificates flowed, but the gold stayed put until one government had a surplus of certificates and cashed them in.) Finally, a
prohibitive tariff wall protected all this activity.
Whatever the complexity of the facts, the reasoning in the
Downs case is the thing of importance. First, the court cited the
result of the Sugar Conference of 1898, which had formulated the
following statement:
85. 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
86. Id. at 509. Like most taxing authorities, the Russian Government collected
an excise on all sugar in storage before it was sold and worried about rebates

afterwards.
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The Conference. . . is of the opinion that bounties whose abolition
is desirable, are understood to be all the advantages conceded to the
manufacturers and refiners by the fiscal legislation of the States,
and that directly and indirectly are borne by the public treasury.
There should be classified as such, notably:

(a)

The direct advantages granted in the case of exportation.

(b) The direct advantages granted to production.
(c) The total or partial exemptions from taxation granted to a
portion of the manufactured products.
(d) The indirect advantages of growing out of surplus or allowance
in manufacturing effected beyond legal estimates.
(e) The profit that may be derived from an excessive drawback.
In addition, the conference is of the opinion that advantages similar to those resulting from bounties hereinbefore defined may be
derived from the disproportion between the rate of customs duties
and that of consumption dues (surtaxes), especially when the public
powers impose, incite, or encourage combinations among sugar
producers.
It would be desirable to regulate surtaxes in such manner as to
confine their operation to the protection of home markets.87
Secondly, the Court went on to define a bounty.
A bounty may be direct, as where a certain amount is paid upon
the production of certain articles . . or indirect, by the remission
of taxes upon the exportation of articles which are subjected to a tax
when sold or consumed in the country of their production, of which
our laws, permitting distillers of spirits to export the same without
payment of an internal revenue tax, or other burden, is an example."
[E]very bounty upon exportation must, to a certain extent, operate as a bounty upon production, since nothing can be exported
which is not produced, and hence a bounty upon exportation, by
creating a foreign demand, stimulates increased production to the
extent of such demand. Conversely, a bounty upon production, operates to a certain extent as a bounty upon exportation, since it
opens to the manufacturer a foreign market for his merchandise
produced in excess of demand at home."8
But if a preference be given to merchandise exported over that
sold in the home market, by the remission of an excise tax, the effect
would be the same as if all merchandise were taxed, and a drawback
paid to the manufacturer upon so much exported.
87. 187 U.S. at 501.
88. Id. at 502.
89. Id. at 512.
90. Id. at 513.
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But where in addition to that, these regulations exempt sugar
exported from excise tax altogether, we think it clearly falls within
the definition of an indirect bounty upon exportation."
Finally, the Court summarized its findings.
The details of this elaborate procedure, for the production, sale,
taxation, and exportation of Russian sugar are of much less importance than the two facts which appear clearly through this maze of
regulations, viz.: that no sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that
does not pay an excise tax of R. 1.75 per pound, and that sugar
exported pays no tax at all . . .When a tax is imposed upon all
sugar produced, but then is remitted upon all sugar exported, then
by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever
name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation.2
Nothing in the case qualified the definition of a bounty by stating
that remission of an indirect tax on the export of a product was not
a subsidy while the remission of a direct tax was a subsidy. Indeed,
the Downs case carefully used the words "direct" and "indirect"
in two ways only. The first way described the difference between
a subsidy aimed specifically at products exported and a subsidy
to a whole industry, a "subsidy to production." The Court used
the words in a second way in order to distinguish a subsidy via
selective rebate of taxes already paid from a direct payment to
the favored industry. Nowhere did the Court use the words "direct" and "indirect" to describe a type of tax rebated. It simply
noted if the excise was refunded only on export, and looked to the
effect of such refund.
The Treasury Department supports its present rule by labeling
the Downs language as dicta and pointing to two other cases that
used the same broad language but nevertheless assessed a countervailing duty on the excess of remission over the original excise. In
Nicholas and Company v. United States,9" the Court upheld an
assessment of countervailing duty on incoming British whiskey for

the over-remission of that country's consumption tax. The remission itself was not called a bounty. Instead, the over-remission,
which the importer called merely a compensatory allowance for
"expenses" incurred during the useless excise process, was the only
amount countervailed. Likewise in Hills Brothers Coffee Co. v.
United States, 4 only the bounty on production of the Dutch sugar
91. Id.
92. Id. at 515.
93. 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
94. 107 F. 107 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901).
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was assessed a countervailing duty, while the remission of the
Dutch tax on sugar consumption was not. No doubt the dollar
results of these two cases differ from the language in Downs. However, it cannot be said with certainty that these decisions repudiate
the reasoning of Downs. No court sitting on appeal of a customs
case can be expected to assess a greater countervailing duty than
the Treasury Department, the plaintiff of the case, has asked.
Moreover, the Supreme Court had already delivered a clear evaluation of what it thought of sales tax rebates in a case decided
shortly before the Downs decision, which it cited in both the Downs
and Nicholas cases. In Passavant v. United States, 5 the Court
dealt with the question of what the fair value of a shipment of
German cotton velvet was on its arrival in the United States. The
Collector had included the value of the remitted German tax on
consumption in his valuation. The importer argued that the true
value did not include the value of the consumption tax because
the goods has not been destined for German consumption. The
Court, confronted with conflicting estimates of market value, held
that the value of the velvet included the amount of the German
excise.
As the question in this case was what was the general market value
and wholesale price of cotton velvets, as bought in the principal
markets of Germany, the fact that the German duty was not in fact
paid on such goods when exported [was] immaterial. Exoneration
from its payment was a mere special advantage extended by the
German Government, as we have said, in promotion of manufacturers and commerce.9 6
The dissents in the case written by Justices Brown and Peckham
underline the holding. "If there be, in fact, two wholesale prices
for these goods in the same markets, I know of no reason why the
collector should not recognize this fact . . ...
- Once again, the

Court had characterized the remission of a national tax on consumption as a bounty on exports, although in Passavantthe characterization did not arise in the countervailing duty context.
In 1905, three years after the Downs case, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals heard a case similar to Passavant, and nicely
distinguished a tax on consumption, which should be part of the
national wholesale price, from an excise, which should not. In
95. 169 U.S. 16 (1897). We are concerned, here, with what the Court thought
in 1897 and not with the GATT Art. VII practices of today.
96. 169 U.S. at 24.
97. Id. at 25.
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Godillot v. United States,9 8 the Customs Collector had included
two different excises on consumption in his valuation. One was the
general tax on the consumption of alcohol throughout France; the
other a consumption tax for wine consumed only in Bordeaux.
Under the French law, both taxes were remitted upon exportation.
The issue of the case was whether the market value should include
one or both taxes. The Court held that the market value in which
United States law was interested was the national market value,
and that while the national consumption tax should be included,
the local Bordeaux duty should not. Similarly, the Countervailing
Duty Law is interested in the effect which a tax rebate has on
bountification of exports. The Godillot case provides an effective
criterion for determining which excise remissions should be countervailed on their entry into the United States and which should
not. A remission of a national excise should result in a countervailing duty, and a remission of a purely local excise should not. Such
a standard promises both ease of administration and accuracy.
Furthermore, a local tax rebate is likely to be small and have an
insignificant effect on exports to the United States. The Treasury,
should it be forced by litigation to assess a countervailing duty for
the remission of sales taxes, probably would not choose to assess a
countervailing duty for the remission of local sales taxes.
The Treasury position exalts tax form over substantive effect,
while the Countervailing Duty Law looks to effect. Its enforcement
is mandatory. Remission of a turnover tax on export amounts to a
direct bounty on and incentive to exports, and such remission
should result in a countervailing duty being assessed on entry into
the American market.
III. THE VALUE-ADDED TAX AND ITS NICHE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK, AS COMPARED-WITH THE PLACE OF THE COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAW IN THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

The Descriptionand Characterizationof the Value-Added
Tax
The value-added tax is a new, multifaceted, accountant's construct that was created to fill a need in the European Community
tax structure, and can be characterized accurately only by a thorough description. The idea of the tax on value-added came independently from two men just at the end of World War I. Thomas
S. Adams, of Yale University, characterized his idea as a
A.

98. 139 F. 1 (2d Cir. 1905).
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"modified business tax." Wilhelm von Siemens, a German governmental consultant, characterized his proposal as a "refined turnover tax.""9 Neither received much support initially.
From 1918 until the creation of the Common Market, the Continental countries tended to use excise taxes measured by sales for
much of their revenue. In France, a welter of special excises on oil,
tobacco, services and the like were in effect. Each had multiple
rates and numerous exemptions. In Germany and several of the
Low Countries, a multi-level cascading turnover tax of up to five
per cent was in effect. This tax was a turnover tax levied on a
percentage of every transfer at every level of the production process. The vendor of raw materials was charged an ad valorem tax
when he sold raw goods to the manufacturer. The manufacturer
paid the same percentage of gross sales on the transfer or turnover
of its finished goods to the wholesaler. The same tax accompanied
every transfer on down to the consumer. "And at each stage, the
tax was built into the price and thus became pyramided and swollen as each sector in turn applied its markup on price plus tax and
then added its own tax." ' In essence, the percentage of tax in the
retail price of a product "cascaded" upward geometrically with the
greater number of transfers. Inevitably, the system favored those
able to vertically integrate their industries through as many stages
as possible and penalized those who could not. This tended to warp
the structure of the economy, once the tax bite got large enough
so that businesses were organized so as to avoid the tax.
The creation of the European Common Market provided both
the opportunity and the need to reform these capricious indirect
tax structures. If the members of the European Community were
to pursue economic integration, they eventually had to harmonize
their tax structures in order to facilitate trade. After some years
of studying the situation, the European Commission issued a series
of directives. 0' Article Two of the First Directive neatly embodied
the reason for creating the V.A.T.:
99. INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FIscAL DOCUMENTATION, IV GUIDES TO EUROPEAN
TAXATION: VALUE ADDED TAXATION IN EUROPE, Introduction at 4 (1973). This loose-

leaf series contains the complete translation of every V.A.T. in Europe, as well
as explanatory materials and E.E.C. Directives [hereinafter cited as GUIDES].
100. Remarks by Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before
the National Industrial Conference Board on the Implications of Tax Harmonization in the European Common Market, as reprinted in 1968 Ways and Means
Hearings.
101. See the First, Second, and Sixth Directives in IV GUIDES or [1973]
E.E.C. Jo. No. 71, at 1301/67.
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The purpose of the common system of tax on value added is to apply
a general tax on consumption to goods and services directly proportional to the price of the goods and services, irrespective of the
number of transactions during the production and distribution process preceding the stage at which the tax is imposed. On each transaction, the tax on value added, calculated on the price of the good
or service at the rate applicable to such good or service, is to be
payable after deduction of the amount of the tax value added which
has directly affected the cost of the various components of the
price."'
The easiest way to envision the V.A.T. is to look at it as a retail
sales tax, the burden of which falls on the retail consumer, but the
collection of which falls on each firm in the chain of production
according to the amount of value it adds to the product. The retailer collects all of a retail sales tax directly from the consumer.
All the V.A.T. does is to split up the collection of the same tax into
as many parts as there are stages of production. So instead of a
retail sales tax, V.A.T. is a multi-leveled turnover tax, the taxable
event of which is the transfer or turnover by each respective vendor
of his product to the vendee at the next stage of production. Each
vendor pays only the taxable percentage of the value that he adds
to the product. To take a simple example:
THREE-STAGE EXAMPLE OF A 10 PERCENT
VALUE ADDED TAX":
Stage of Production

1. Sales Price

Total

A

B

C

$300

$700

$1,000

2. Purchased Inputs

-

300

700

$1,000

3. Value added (1-2)

300

400

300

1,000

4. Tax on value added
(105/ of 3)

30

40

30

100

100

100

5. Retail sales tax
(1054 of Cl)

-

102. Id. at First Directive 5.
103. McClure, supra note 78, at 11.

-
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A ten percent retail sales tax on a purchase of $1000 would be $100.
In the example, the V.A.T. also would total $100, with A paying
$30, B paying $40, and C paying $30.
The example is oversimplified, because it does not divide the
purchased input category into intermediate and capital goods.
Two types of tax could be constructed if it did. One, the consumption type, does not distinguish new capital goods from other types
of input and subtracts all input from the output price. The Europeans have chosen it to be their tax and the other, the income
version, therefore is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper.' 4
Once the Community had decided on the consumption version,
it had to decide how to collect it. There were four methods from
which to choose, and each resulted in precisely the same amount
of tax being collected. An examination of the four well illustrates
the slippery nature of the V.A.T.15 The four methods can best be
illustrated as Allen Tait did in his book, Value Added Tax:
A tax on value added is, briefly, a tax levied on businesses on
the value they add to their purchases of raw materials, and
goods and services. Leaving aside the problem of capital and
stocks, we can represent this by writing value added (V/A),
equals total output (0), minus total input (I) on purchases on
current account.
(a)
V/A = 0 - I
Clearly, the difference between output and the inputs of raw
materials, energy, containers, etc., is the payment of wages and

salaries (W), and the residual, which we will call profit (P).
From (a)

0- I= W + P

(b)

V/A=O-I-W+P

(c)

So value added can be derived either by subtraction (0 - I) or
by addition (W + P). These forms of calculation are sometimes
called the subtractive (or subtraction) method and the additive
method (or procedure or process). The tax rate (t) on value
added (tV/A) can then be applied in at least four ways:
104. The income V.A.T. would add only the cost of current capital depreciation to the cost of raw materials. The tax resulting would be the equivalent "to a
flat rate personal income tax with no exemptions or deductions." McClure, supra
note 78, at 15.
105. The inclusive-exclusive distinction would bring the number of possible
collection methods to eight. Only the French use inclusive VAT. The distinction
is irrelevant to an investigation of the nature of the tax. See TArr, VALuE ADDED
TAx 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as TArt].
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direct additive
indirect additive

tW, A
tV/A

direct subtractive
indirect subtractive

tV, A
tV'A

=
=
=
=

t(W + P)
tW + tP
t(O - I)
tO - tI
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(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

or invoice method
As will become clearer below, the indirect methods never actually
calculate the value added at each stage, but only the amount of
tax owed.'
Under the direct additive method, the businessman totals up all
wages paid and net income accumulated during the taxing period,
takes out the required percentage of tax, and pays the V.A.T. to
the government. This method has the advantage of simplicity.
The taxpayer knows precisely what activities are being taxed. In
addition, he can take the figures directly from accounting ledgers
that he probably keeps already; so if the tax were collected once a
year, there would be little extra expense.
However, if the government wants payments every month, the
businessman has to calculate his earnings figures once a month as
well. This generates increased accounting costs. One way around
such increased expenses is to use the indirect additive method of
calculation. Instead of totaling profits and wages together, the indirect method allows the separate computation of tax on each
component. The total wages are figured, and then the taxable
percentage taken. The same figuring is done on the net income.
Then the two tax totals are added together. This type V.A.T.
would actually be two taxes masquerading under the same
label-a proportional tax on wages attached to a proportional tax
on profits. As such, it would' have increased flexibility. For in-

stance, the wage tax might be collected monthly, with the net
income tax calculated and collected only once a year. This would
probably eliminate the extra administrative expenses (which
would have been generated by the once a month calculation of net
profit under the direct additive method) and still would give the
government a continuous flow of cash. The government also might
fine-tune the economy by manipulating the wage and income rates
against each other, or by raising or lowering either or both tax rates
at different times during the year." 7
Neither subtractive method has the same type of flexibility or
106. TArr, supra note 105, at 2. The Tait book is the easiest one with which
to learn the essentials of V.A.T.
107. Id. at 13.
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simplicity as the additive method. Both subtractive methods require the accumulation of invoices. Consequently, the costs of record keeping are greater. However, the invoice requirement was
probably the chief aspect that attracted the Community to the
subtractive methods. First, the invoice collecting procedures were
already in place throughout the Community, since the V.A.T.
would replace the multi-leveled, cascade tax. Secondly, such extensive recordkeeping would make the system easier to police, particularly in such countries as Italy and France where tax evasion
is a national sport. The taxing authorities could walk into any
retail establishment, select a product, and then follow a trail of
invoices back to that product's starting point. If an invoice was
missing at any level, the taxing authorities would know where to
begin auditing." 8
One can easily calculate the V.A.T. due under the direct subtractive approach by first totaling all sales receipts for the taxing
period, then totaling all invoices of incoming raw materials, subtracting the latter from the former to get the net value added
throughout the taxing period, and finally taking a percentage of
the net value added for remission to the government as tax.
The European Community eventually chose the indirect subtractive method, also known as the invoice method. Though cumbersome, the invoice method has two primary advantages. First,
the method allows each vendor and vendee to calculate exactly
how much tax is due on each individual transfer, no matter what
the level in the production process. Thus each vendee knows how
much V.A.T. has been passed onto him, and how much he should
pass on in turn. The government also knows exactly how much
money should be credited to the account of a vendor who exports
a product."9 Secondly, the invoice method lets the government set
different rates of V.A.T. on different types of transactions, if it
should want to channel consumption into certain areas. For instance, food can be rated at five per cent while motor cars are rated
at thirty per cent. Similarly, certain commodities may be exempted from the V.A.T. altogether. The setting of different rates
makes the administration of V.A.T. vastly more complex than it
would have been had a fiat all-inclusive rate been set."1 Indeed, a
multiple rate V.A.T. might warp an economy as much as the cascade taxes it replaced. However, whatever the adverse economic
108.

Id. at 9.

109.

Id.

110.

Id. at 15.
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consequences of a multi-rate V.A.T., European politicians apparently felt that a tax that looked regressive would be easier to sell
to the public if it were strategically modified.'"
The V.A.T. is not difficult to calculate under the indirect subtractive method. Suppose there exists a steel manufacturer, who
has all his capital equipment in place, and who is about to make
one-hundred tons of steel to be sold in one ton units. When he buys
the coke, pig iron and other raw materials necessary to make the
steel, he gets invoices, each of which lists the cost of the raw material and shows the V.A.T. being collected by the vendor of that raw
material. The steel manufacturer, obviously, pays the cost plus the
V.A.T. When he gets all his raw materials, it is a simple matter to
add up all the V.A.T. already paid and divide that total by the
number of steel units that will be produced. The steel manufacturer thus knows how much V.A.T. already has been paid on each
unit of steel that he eventually sells. When he sells the steel to his
wholesaler, the wholesaler will pay the asking price, plus the percentage of V.A.T., which is calculated just as with any sales tax.
For example, a ton of steel sold for $100 in a country with a ten

per cent V.A.T. will cost $110 to a buyer. So, the steel manufacturer has two sets of documents after the sale of all the units of
steel. First, he has the invoices from the acquisition of all his raw
materials, from which the respective V.A.T. percentages have been
totaled and divided by the number of steel units manufactured to
show the amount of V.A.T. already paid on each unit. (For purposes of illustration, suppose the V.A.T. costs per unit manufactured are $5, i.e. the raw materials cost $5 in all). Secondly, the
manufacturer has his own sales slips which show that he sold each
unit of steel for $100 plus a ten per cent V.A.T. tax. Thus, the
manufacturer knows that he has collected $10 V.A.T. per unit sold
as compared with $5 V.A.T. costs he already has paid for the raw
material going into each steel unit. To figure his tax owed, the
steelmaker simply subtracts the $5 of V.A.T. paid per "unit"
bought from the $10 V.A.T. collected on each unit sold. Thus the
tax on the value that the steel manufacturer has added to the raw
materials he bought is $5. Under the indirect subtractive method,
then, the vendor figures his tax by subtracting the tax paid on
inputs from the tax collected on output. His share of the V.A.T. is
the difference between the two. He never calculates the value
which he has added to each product but figures only the tax which
111.

Ture, supra note 80, at 72.
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he owes-hence the label indirect. (The value added in the example would be $50.)
The invoice method is simple enough to understand, particularly
for the consumer who sees the tax percentages itemized on his sales
slips. It is only when multiple rates are added to the mix that the
politicians can start manipulating the tax. Aside from setting a
high or low rate on products that the legislature sees as luxuries
or necessities, a product can be exempted from V.A.T. or zero
rated. The effects of the latter two are by no means identical.
If a legislature wants to hide the V.A.T. content of a product
from the retail buyer, it may exempt the retailer from the tax.
"Exempting" means removing the transaction from the V.A.T.
structure entirely. No V.A.T. is charged to the consumer, at least
ostensibly, and no V.A.T. included in the retailer's input costs is
remitted either."2 Theoretically, the incidence of the tax will fall
on the retailer, who will not get his remission and should not pass
on the tax. Actually, the V.A.T. is passed along to the retail
consumer in the form of a higher price, and only sophisticated
consumers will be any wiser. A related ploy is to exempt one intermediate link in the production chain, while retaining the V.A.T.
on the links following. The consumer again can be fooled, because
his invoice shows only the V.A.T. collected after the exempted

link. The so-called base price will hide the V.A.T. collected before

the exempt stage of production. This is a cascade tax in V.A.T.
clothing. The exemption effect and a related "catch up" effect
(which occurs when a producer at one level of production is taxed
for more than his value added because a producer at an earlier
level paid a lower rate)11 3 are basic to a full understanding of
V.A.T., but are beyond the scope of this paper, which is concerned
only with the characterization of V.A.T. as direct or indirect, as
that characterization relates to section 303.
The zero rating of a product exported from a V.A.T. country is
even more significant, however, because it and practices similar to
it are the cause of the present international difficulties. Zero rating
entitles the vendor to a credit equal to the amount of V.A.T. that
he paid on his input, while simultaneously allowing such vendor
to sell his product with a V.A.T. percentage of zero. In other words,
when an exporter sells his goods outside his home country, he adds
no V.A.T. to his sales price, and he is entitled to a rebate for the
112. The writer was in Britain during V.A.T. passage through Parliament. He

knows precisely how the tax was sold to a very skeptical public.
113. TArr, supra note 105, at 20 et seq.
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V.A.T. that he paid to his suppliers."' Zero rating makes sense
only if the V.A.T. is equated to a turnover tax on consumption, and
only if one subscribes to the traditional view of the incidence of
indirect taxes.
On the other hand, a product imported into a V.A.T. country
will incur the excise on consumption like any other product consumed in a V.A.T. country. Should the product come from the
United States, its price will include both the V.A.T..on consumption and any United States corporate income tax passed on by its
manufacturer. Furthermore, if the product somehow should miss
the V.A.T. by virtue of its sale to an exempt vendee in a later stage
of production, the government will impose a surcharge of an equivalent amount upon entry."' The rebate and surcharge mechanisms
are collectively called Border Tax Adjustments, and have been the
subject of heated negotiation ever since American manufacturers
began to feel their effects."'
The Treasury Department and other economic forecasting agencies cannot fairly be faulted for failing to predict the effect that the
Community change to V.A.T. had. The Community characterization of its new tax as indirect should not have had the effect that
it did. The cascade tax system had been an indirect one, and the
European countries had been remitting their indirect taxes on

exportation all along. The trouble was that no one, neither the
governments nor their business taxpayers, knew the real extent of
the tax under the old system. Instead, the governments had taken
an educated guess as to what the tax cost within each product was,
and rebated the "estimate." Not until the advent of V.A.T. with
its exact accounting procedures, and the resulting recalculation of
the Border Tax Adjustments, did the Europeans discover that
their cascade tax estimates had been too low. After V.A.T., the
amount of tax remission on Community exports rose, and consequently the export prices on their products dropped."' Certainly
114. Id. at 56.
115. This zero rating is used only for purposes of illustration. Actually, only
the Dutch have a zero rating; the other V.A.T. countries do the same thing in
effect. To be precisb, the remission of tax on consumption is the problem, not the

zero rating per se.
116. Only the double taxation itself is important here, not the method by

which it is accomplished.
117. In 1967, the Europeans even refused to discuss the matter. See also,
Statement by Representative of the United States on Border Taxes Before GATr
Working Party, April 30, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Spec. Rep. Statement of

1968].
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the relative decline in the competitive stance of American products
as against European products cannot entirely be ascribed to the
institution of the V.A.T. The United States balance-of-trade position had deteriorated even prior to the effective date of the
Mehrwertsteuer in the German Federal Republic on January 1,
1968.118 Indeed, Congress had held hearings on the deteriorating
position of the American steel industry in 1966. 11But whatever the
reason, beginning in 1968, American business stood up and took
notice of section 303 for the first time since the end of World War
II.' And as the V.A.T. rates rose, so did interest in the Countervailing Duty Law and in V.A.T. itself.
Nor were the Europeans unmindful of the ambiguous character
of V.A.T. Indeed, the French actually repealed a 4.25 per cent
payroll tax and replaced it with a one to five per cent increase in
their several V.A.T. rates, knowing that the latter could be rebated

on exports while the former could not.'2' Germans, prior to the
Federal Republic's adoption of the V.A.T., complained of the
"virtual customs protection" that the earlier French V.A.T., with
its higher rates, gave to French products at the expense of German
products, which were cascade taxed at a lower rate.' 2 Even the
indirect subtraction method of calculation was selected partly because it served to emphasize the indirect aspect of the tax.'2 There
are no German complaints now.
The V.A.T. cannot simply be shrugged off as another variant of
indirect taxation. The additive methods of calculation clearly
must be characterized as direct. The V.A.T. can be a direct proportional tax on payroll and profits just as easily as it can be a tax
on consumption.12 No one disputes that the amount of tax collected is not identical under all four methods of calculation. If the
V.A.T. serves to illustrate anything, it illustrates the breakdown
of the traditional, theoretical assumptions of direct/indirect tax
shifting in the import/export area. The direct and indirect aspects
of V.A.T. are merely two sides of the same coin. One country
calling the tax direct should not be held to have granted an export
118. Surrey, in 1968 Ways and Means Hearings,supra note 81, at 70.
119.

IV EURoPEAN GUIDES, Ger. Fed. Rep. at 4.

120.

See note 2 supra.

121.

Feller, supra note 9, at 49.

122. TArt, supra note 105, at 15.
123. Stout, Economic Aspects of a Value Added Tax in the U.K. in THE VALUE
ADDED TAx (1968) amply illustrates British expectations for the tax at a time
before passage.
124. Id. at 12.
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bounty when it remits the V.A.T. on export, while another country
calling the tax indirect is allowed to remit the whole V.A.T. on
export without violating international law. Any international
treaty allowing such a result should be challenged.
B.

The GATT Position on Tax Rebates
on Exports and Countervailing
Duties

The GATT position on the indirect/direct tax controversy is distinctly traditional. Article VI, section 4 clearly states the GATT
position, both on excise tax remission and on countervailing duties:
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to antidumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such
product from taxes bourne by the like product when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of
the refund of such duties or taxes.'15
Article VI, section 6(a), may contain the reason why the Congress
wrote the provision into the Trade Bill of 1974 which required a
finding of injury by the United States Tariff Commission before
assessment of a countervailing duty on non-dutied goods, the import area to which the Countervailing Duty Law had not been
extended before:
No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing
duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another
contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or
threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is
such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry.
However, the original countervailing duty as it applied to dutiable
products was not amended to provide for a finding of domestic
injury because the so-called "grandfather clause" exempted it
from the Treaty. A recent Senate Finance Committee Staff Report
bluntly has enunciated the congressional position on the General
Agreements:
The basic GATT agreement was completed in 1947 but it never had
been submitted to the Congress for its study and approval. It is
125. DAM, supra note 75, at 401.
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being observed by the United States through a "protocol of provisional application."
The "protocol of provisional application" stated that the eight governments who signed it would undertake "not later than November
15, 1947, to apply provisionally on and after January 1, 1948":...
(b) Part II of that agreement to the fullest extent not
inconsistent with existing legislation.
This protocol is still in effect, although GATT has been amended a
number of times . ... Thus the basic treaty is a complex set of
instruments, applying with different rigor to different countries.126
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Treasury Department might have found the remission of
V.A.T. by the Community on the export of its steel to be a bounty
under section 303 by either one of two theories. First, the Treasury
might have characterized the V.A.T. as a direct tax. Any rebate
clearly would have been in violation of section 303 and the GATT.
Or, the Treasury might have called the tax indirect and the rebate
of V.A.T. upon export a bounty under section 303 and invoked the
"grandfather clause" in the protocol of provisional application of
1947. Unfortunately, the Treasury did neither; instead, it characterized V.A.T. as an indirect tax and claimed that the remission
on exportation of indirect taxes never had been labeled a bounty

under section 303.
The Treasury did not take the same position in 1971. In hearings
before the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary Connally stated:
[T]he time has come for us to either demand the same treatment
for direct taxes, or to play their game and insist that their valueadded tax be treated the same as our direct taxes or that in any
future tax measures, that we consider the possibility of adopting the
value-added tax.In
The Secretary made his statement knowing that the 1969 revision
of GATT did not reflect his view. 2 ' He was aware, also, that the
strong position taken by the United States Representative to the
GATT Working Party in 1968129 had failed to convince the other
signatories of the Treaty of the need for change.
126.

GA'T, STAFF OF SENATE
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 920 (1970).
127. Hearings of Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1971).
STAFF ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN IssuEs RAISED BY THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 2,

128. Spec. Rep. Statement of 1968, supra note 117.
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The Secretary was correct. The United States must either adopt
V.A.T. itself or force a showdown over the direct/indirect tax shifting issue. The Congress was fully aware of these alternatives when
it passed the Trade Act of 1974. It knew the inequitable situation
could not go on indefinitely, and it was not prepared to adopt a
V.A.T. for the United States. Clearly, the congressional intent was
to force the issue, but to give the Treasury four years of manuevering time in which to do it. There were two legal routes to take, and
the Congress probably did not care so much how the issue was
forced so long as it was forced. Congress left the Treasury with the
proper tools to implement either theory. However, instead of using
the tools which it had been given within the limited areas of its
remaining discretion, the Treasury chose not to press the issue at
all. The Treasury has thus frustrated the will of Congress, and its
position should be reversed on appeal.
The subject of countervailing duties and the V.A.T. is obscure,
complex, and important. Those who are not in favor of protectionism and who are in favor of world-wide free trade would make a
great mistake to dismiss the countervailing duty issue out of hand
as merely another attempt by complacent industries to freeze foreign competition out of the American market. They might be surprised to find themselves on the same side as the steel industry,

once they examine all the facts.
Charles L. Chambers
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APPENDIX I-THE RECORD
A LOG OF TRAFFIC THROUGH THE COLLECTOR'S OFFICE AND THE
COURTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE

COUNTERVAILING DUTY ON BOUNTY-FED IMPORTS

1897
T.D. 18,345, [1897] Gen. App. Dec. 828 (1897): France is held to
pay a bounty on dried codfish; a countervailing duty is assessed.
T.D. 18,387, [1897] Gen. App. Dec. 868 (1897): Dutch sugar
shipped before September I will not be countervailed against.
T.D. 18,504, [1897] Gen. App. Dec. 972 (1897): H.L. Hobart Co.
protested countervailing duty levied on Belgian and Dutch sugars
to no avail.
T.D. 18,660, [1897] Gen. App. Dec. 1159 (1897): Beet sugar from
Denmark countervailed at 13 1/2 cents per 100 pounds.

T.D. 18,679, [1897] Gen. App. Dec. 1172 (1897): Countervailing
duty on Argentine sugar is set at 13 1/2 cents per 100 pounds.
1898
T.D. 18,784, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 31 (1898): Countervailing duty is set on dried fish from St. Pierre and Miquelon, France,
at 10 francs per 50 kilos, fresh fish exempted.
T.D. 18,882, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 142 (1898): Those wishing amount of duty announced for Belgian sugar must wait until

it is figured; liquidation of duty suspended.
T.D. 19,071, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 390 (1898): Direct and
indirect bounties are found to be paid on French sugar; duties
assessed.
T.D. 19,108, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. I 429 (1898): Sugar
shipped without label showing country of origin will be assessed
at the highest countervailing duty.

T.D. 19,256, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. I 610 (1898): Tate and
Lyle sugar from England will be taxed at highest rate, as many
different kinds are mixed in its refinery, making it impossible to
determine from where the sugar originally came.
T.D. 19,318, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 693 (1898): Raw sugar
from Germany polarizing below 90 degrees will not be countervailed, as it gets no bounty.
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T.D. 19,361, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 754 (1898): Countervailing duty on granulated 90 degree sugar from Germany is levied at
3.55 marks per 100 kilos.
T.D. 19,397, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. I 793 (1898): Unbountifled raw sugar from Java gets a countervailing duty set, if it is
mixed with Dutch bountified sugar during its refining process in
the Netherlands.
T.D. 19,425, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 826 (1898): Raw sugars
from Holland and Belgium taxed at the higher Dutch rate when
importer is unable to allocate percentages of his cargo.
T.D. 19,632, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. II 55 (1898): Sugar
sweetened milk chocolate will not be assessed for its sugar content.
T.D. 20,039, [1898] Gen. App. Dec. Vol. II 534 (1898): Protest of
Hills Brothers Co. against duty assessment on Dutch sugar is
overruled by the General Board of Appraisers.
T.D. 20,407, [18981 Gen. App. Dec. Vol. 1 996 (1898): R.E. Downs
is assessed a countervailing duty on sugar held bountified by Russia. A duty is also assessed on sugar from Argentina, AustriaHungary, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
1899
T.D. 21,501, 1 TREAS. DEC. 252 (1899): Wallace, Muller v. U.S.:
The Board of Appraisers may review the question of whether an
export bounty exists, but if there is such bounty, its estimate by
the Secretary of the Treasury is conclusive. The matter of amount
is not reviewable.
T.D. 21,526, 1 TREAS. DEC. 292 (1899): The highest duty is charged
to unlabelled sugar as per T.D. 18,323, 19,108 (1898).
T.D. 22,633, 1 TREAS. DEC. 972 (1899): Sugar produce from the
French West Indies is held not subject to countervailing duty if
imported directly to this country; however, said sugar, if imported
indirectly, will be subject to the regular French duty.
1900
1901
Hills Brothers Co. v. United States, 107 F. 107 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1901): The holding of T.D. 20,039 (1898) upheld.
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T.D. 22,984, 4 TREAS. DEC. 405 (1901): T.D. 20,407 against R.E.
Downs on the countervailing duty on Russian sugar is upheld by
the U.S. General Appraisers at New York.
1902
T.D. 23,503, 5 TREAS. DEC. 77 (1902): U.S. General Board of
Appraisers at New York upholds the assessment and computation
of countervailing duty on sugar from Germany based on the German bill of lading weight, despite evaporation enroute. The Franklin Sugar Co. appeals.
1903
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903): T.D. 22,984 (1901)
is upheld.
1904
T.D. 25,538, 8 TREAS. DEC. 211 (1904): Procedural question is resolved in favor of Treasury with regard to Russian sugar.
1905
T.D. 26,190, 9 TREAS. DEC. 503 (1905): Collector loses two procedural complaints over sugar imported from Germany before the
General Board of Appraisers. This time Wallace, Muller Co. wins.
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 137 F. 655
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1905): T.D. 23,503 (1902) is upheld.
T.D. 26,225, 9 TREAS. DEC. 577 (1905): Duty of 11.25 centavos per
kilo is levied on Argentine sugar.
1906
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 142 F. 376 (3d Cir.
1906): Justice Gray reverses the lower court and the Board of Appraisers decision of T.D. 23,503 (1902).
T.D. 27,309, 11 TREAS. DEC. 599 (1906): In a case not dealing with
sugar weight, the Board of Appraisers rule against Franklin Sugar
Co.

T.D. 27,701, 12 TREAS. DEC. 206 (1906): Treasury announces it will
not acquiesce in Franklin Sugar unless the missing sugar can
clearly be shown to have been thrown overboard.
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1907
T.D. 27,864, 13 TREAS. DEC. 74 (1907): Board of Appraisers reverse
Collector on precise Franklin Sugar point. American Sugar
Company's protests are sustained. See T.D. 27,701 (1906).
T.D. 27,892, 13 TREAS. DEC. 148 (1907): Collector again assesses
Franklin Sugar Co. on the basis of export weight as per T.D. 23,503
(1902).
1908
1909
1910

Franklin Sugar Co. v. United States, 178 F. 743 (C.C.E.D.Pa.
1910): T.D. 27,309 (1906) is upheld.
1911
Franklin Sugar Co. v. United States, 1 Ct. Cust. App. 242 (1911):
T.D. 27,309 (1906) is upheld in the Court of Customs Appeals on
appeal from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Franklin Sugar Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Cust. App. 116 (1911):
The Court of Customs Appeals sustains the protest to T.D. 27,892
(1907) for precisely the same reasons as the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in 142 F. 376 (1906). The end of a saga!
T.D. 31,229, 20 TREAS. DEC. 125 (1911): Collector assesses countervailing duties on certain British spirits.
1912
T.D. 31,490, 20 TREAS. DEC. 692 (1912): Duty on British spirits is
revoked.
T.D. 32,768, 23 TREAS. DEC. 107 (1912): Countervailing duties are
announced on certain German agricultural imports as a result of
an export certificate bounty scheme.
1913

T.D. 33,182, 24 TREAS. DEC. 203 (1913): Sugar refined in Denmark
is no longer subject to countervailing duty; T.D. 18,660 (1897) is
revoked.
T.D. 33,699, 25 TREAS. DEC. 134 (1913): Duty of two balboas per
quintal on toquilla straw from Panama is announced to counter a
direct subsidy.
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T.D. 33,726, 25 TREAS. DEC. 161 (1913): Because Australia paid ten
per cent or up to $6000 per year on exports of dried fruit and 1 d.
per pound on the first 1 million pounds of combed wool tops exported, an equivalent countervailing duty on their import to the
United States was announced.
T.D. 33,953, 25 TREAS. DEC. 579 (1913): The German agricultural
duties announced in T.D. 32,768 (1912) are recalculated.
T.D. 34,466, 26 TREAS. DEC. 825 (1913): Duties are reassessed and
reannounced on certain British spirits; Treasury invites judicial
review.

1914
T.D. 34,752, 27 TREAs. DEC. 176 (1914): Clarification of British
spirit order.
T.D. 34,982, 27 TREAS. DEC. 607 (1914): British rum is excluded
from T.D. 34,466 (1913).
T.D. 35,055, 28 TREAS. DEC. 34 (1914): Scotch is subject to a T.D.
34,466 (1913) duty.

1915
T.D. 35,595, 29 TREAS. DEC. 59 (1915): Nicholas and Co. protests
the countervailing duty on British spirits in T.D. 34,466 (1913), but
the General Board of Appraisers overrules the protest.

T.D. 35,668, 29 TREAS. DEC. 175 (1915): Orange Bitters are added
to T.D. 34,466 (1913) list.
1916
T.D. 36,073, 30 TREAS. DEC. 59 (1916): Announcement of countervailing duty on German white beans along with method of computation.
Nicholas and Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97 (1916): The
Court of Customs Appeals affirms the General Board of Appraisers
decision in T.D. 35,595 (1915).
1917
T.D. 37,088, 32 TREAS. DEC. 338 (1917): Duty on French codfish is
upped to fifteen francs per quintel. See T.D. 18,345 (1897).
T.D. 37,264, 33 TREAS. DEC. 14 (1917): Duty on Australian combed
wool tops is revoked. See T.D. 33,726 (1913).

866

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9: 819

T.D. 37,314, 33 TREAS. DEC. 130 (1917): Portugese wine is found to
be receiving a direct bounty; a countervailing duty is announced.
T.D. 37,336, 33 TREAS. DEC. 166 (1917): Portuguese wine order is
clarified.
1918
T.D. 37,575, 34 TREAS. DEC. 246 (1918): Wine from the Azores and
Madiera is added to duty list. See T.D. 37,314 (1917).
1919
Nicholas and Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919): The Court
of Customs Appeals in 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97 (1916) is affirmed.
1920
1921
1922
1923
T.D. 39,746, 44 TREAS. DEC. 45 (1923): Beef from South Africa is
countervailed.
T.D. 39,830, 44 TREAS. DEC. 196 (1923): Coal from Spain held is
bountified; liquidation of duty is suspended.
1924
1925
T.D. 40,895, 47 TREAS. DEC. 616 (1925): Prussiate soda from
Holland is countervailed.
1926
T.D. 41,500, 49 TREAS. DEC. 694 (1926): Since Indian Government
subsidizes all pig iron production, such support constitutes an
indirect bounty and merits a countervailing duty. Liquidation of
duties is suspended pending investigation of the amount of support.
T.D. 41,730, 50 TREAS. DEC. 189 (1926): Liquidation of duty on
Indian pig iron remains suspended while the American counsel in
Calcutta attempts to get the offending exporting company's books.
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1927
T.D. 42,161, 51 TREAs. DEC. 667 (1927): T.D. 41,500 (1926) is
revoked as India repeals her bounty on pig iron.
1928
T.D. 42,895, 54 TREAS. DEC. 101 (1928): Countervailing duty on
British silk is announced because the British Government allows
a drawback on exportation of processed silk which is more than the
tariff it collects on importation of raw silk.
T.D. 42,937, 54 TREAS. DEC. 162 (1928): Because butter from Australia is bountified, countervailing duty is announced.
1929
T.D. 43,634, 56 TREAS. DEC. 342 (1929): Duty on British silk announced in T.D. 42,895 (1928) is extended to artificial silk.
1930
1931
T.D. 44,742, 59 TREAS. DEC. 697 (1931): British silk duties are

recalculated.
1932
Abs. 22,079, 62 TREAS. DEC. 999 (1932): Anchovies from Italy are
countervailed.
1933
1934
T.D. 47,312, 66 TREAS. DEC. 362 (1934): Because of refunds allowed
German aluminium manufacturers on export, a countervailing
duty on their importation is announced.
1935
T.D. 47,475, 67 TREAS. DEC. 79 (1935): British silk bounty
information is supplemented.
T.D. 47,487, 67 TREAS. DEC. 128 (1935): Portugal stops her wine
bounty, so T.D. 37,336 (1917) is revoked.
T.D. 47,502, 67 TREAS. DEC. 188 (1935): British silk duty information is again supplemented.
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T.D. 47,594, 67 TREAS. DEC. 463 (1935): Information on British silk

bounty amounts is re-supplemented.
T.D. 47,658, 67 TREAS. DEC. 685 (1935): Split green peas are found

to be bountified by the Netherlands in the amount of 2 to 2.5
guilders per 100 kilos; duty is announced.
T.D. 47,675, 67 TREAS. DEC. 735 (1935): A direct bounty given to
Finnish cheese of 2.50 markkas per kilo provokes a countervailing
duty.
T.D. 47,693, 67 TREAS. DEC. 781 (1935): New rates for French fish

from St. Pierre and Miquelon are ascertained. See T.D. 18,784
(1898).
T.D. 47,742, 67 TREAS. DEC. 926 (1935): Pending further considera-

tion, provisions of T.D. 47,693 are suspended and collectors of
customs will take no action under said decision.
T.D. 47,753, 67 TREAS. DEC. 939 (1935): British spirit duties are
declared to be in full force and effect.
T.D. 47,896, 68 TREAS. DEC. 305 (1935): Danish butter is countervailed at .3986 Danish krone per kilogram; no explanation.
T.D. 47,944, 68 TREAS. DEC. 425 (1935): Countervailing duty is
declared on rye grain from Poland of 7.89 zloty per kilogram; no
explanation.
T.D. 47,945, 68 TREAS. DEC. 426 (1935): Yellow prussiate soda from
Holland is found not to be bountified; therefore, the suspension of
liquidation ordered in T.D. 40,895 (1925) is revoked.
1936
T.D. 48,238, 69 TREAS. DEC. 604 (1936): Irish canned hams are

countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 48,344, 69 TREAS. DEC. 977 (1936): Irish canned ham order is

amended.
T.D. 48,360, 69 TREAS. DEC. 1008 (1936): Countervailing duty on
ten German products is declared; no explanation.

T.D. 48,364, 69 TREAS. DEC. 1012 (1936): Irish repeal their bounty
before the implementation date of T.D. 48,238, which would have
countervailed the bounty; duty is revoked.
T.D. 48,444, 70 TREAS. DEC. 134 (1936): The countervailing duty

on German goods detailed in T.D. 48,360 does not include gifts
brought to the United States for personal use.
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T.D. 48,551, 70 TREAs. DEC. 365 (1936): Australia ends bounty on
butter, so T.D. 42,937 (1928) is revoked.
T.D. 48,588, 70 TREAS. DEC. 490 (1936): Under T.D. 33,699 (1913),
a duty was announced on Panamian toquilla straw. Apparently, no
bounties were ever paid under the law and it has been repealed;
the countervailing duty is revoked.
T.D. 48,679, 70 TREAS. DEC. 811 (1936): Where a treaty and a later
tariff are inconsistent, the latter will prevail.
T.D. 48,734, 71 TREAS. DEC. 1 (1936): Butter bounty paid by

Denmark was discontinued for shipments direct to the United
States as of twenty-seven days after the duty was announced. Direct imports will no longer be countervailed.
T.D. 48,914, 71 TREAS. DEC. 620 (1936): Poland stops payments on
rye grain exports as of March 16, 1936, hence countervailing duty
order issued in T.D. 47,944 (1935) is revoked.
1937
T.D. 48,973, 71 TREAS. DEC. 789 (1937): Where an importer on
entry adds to the invoice value an amount which he alleges equals

the bounty paid by the country of export, and declares such
amount as entered value, the collector is without authority to assess duty on any lower amount. This is true not only as to the
assessment of regular duty but also the countervailing duty.
T.D. 49,114, 72 TREAS. DEC. 225 (1937): As bounties are not currently being paid by the Netherlands on split pea shipments direct
to the United States, duties will be dropped on direct imports but
continued on indirect imports. See T.D. 47,658 (1935).
T.D. 49,122, 72 TREAS. DEC. 241 (1937): Lithuanian butter is countervailed at a rate of 0.30 litas per kilogram; no explanation.
T.D. 49,157, 72 TREAS. DEC. 305 (1937): Suspension of liquidation
on all sugar products and products containing sugar from Australia
is announced pending duty determination.
T.D. 49,196, 72 TREAS. DEC. 403 (1937): Duty on saltwater fish from
Nova Scotia is announced; no explanation.
T.D. 49,269, 72 TREAS. DEC. 664 (1937): The countervailing duty
on Nova Scotian saltwater fish does not include dried fish.
T.D. 49,280, 72 TREAS. DEC. 689 (1937): T.D. 33,726 (1913) on dried
fruits, and T.D. 37,264 (1917) on wool tops from Australia, are
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revoked as the bounty laws are no longer on that country's statute
books.
1938
T.D. 49,351, 73 TREAS. DEC. 102 (1938): T.D. 49,196 (1937) duty on

Nova Scotian fish amended.
T.D. 49,355, 73 TREAS. DEC. 107 (1938): The excess of drawback
over duties collected on imported raw sugar by Britain make sugar
products refined in Britain dutiable to the extent of that excess.
Minerva Automobiles v. United States, 96 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A.
1938): The later countervailing duty law enacted by Congress must
override the most-favored-nation clause in the Treaty with Belgium of 1875.
T.D. 49,471, 73 TREAS. DEC. 507 (1938): T.D. 37,088 (1917), which

ordered a duty on codfish from certain French ports; T.D. 39,746
(1923), which ordered a duty imposed on beef from South Africa,
and T.D. 39,830 (1923), ordering a duty on coal from Spain, are all
revoked as outdated.
T.D. 49,490, 73 TREAS. DEC. 567 (1938): T.D. 32,768 (1912), T.D.

32,828 (1912), T.D. 32,939 (1912), T.D. 33,953 (1913), T.D. 33,975
(1913), and T.D. 36,073 (1916) are revoked, as the German Government ceased to pay a bounty as of September 24, 1937.

T.D. 49,719, 74 TREAS. DEC. 192 (1938): Ethylene dibromide from
Germany is countervailed at 3.775 cents per pound; no explanation.
T.D. 49,729, 74 TREAS. DEC. 205 (1938): Suspension of liquidation
of duties on Dutch dairy produce results from a determination
that bounties are being paid. A deposit will be required pending

calculation of the amount of countervailing duties; no explanation
of type of bounty.
T.D. 49,741, 74 TREAS. DEC. 218 (1938): Suspension of liquidation

of duties is ordered on direct and indirect shipments of chicory
from the Netherlands pending ascertainment of amount of bounty
paid; no explanation.
T.D. 49,749, 74 TREAS. DEC. 232 (1938): Suspension of liquidation

on Dutch milk products in T.D. 49,729 is suspended after official
notice that the procedure on which the duty was based had been
discontinued.
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1939
T.D. 49,809, 74 TREAS. DEC. 366 (1939): Suspension of liquidation
of duties on certain meat produce from the Netherlands is announced, pending ascertainment of amount of Dutch bounties.
T.D. 49,821, 74 TREAS. DEC. 389 (1939): German products imported
as a result of barter type transactions on which the product imported here is traded at a discounted value necessitate a countervailing duty equal to the premium.
T.D. 49,829, 74 TREAS. DEC. 400 (1939): T.D. 49,729 (1938) is modified. Only the bounty on direct shipments here was suspended by
the Dutch. Duty remains in effect for dairy products entering indirectly from the Netherlands.
T.D. 49,849, 74 TREAS. DEC. 438 (1939): Items brought back as
personal gifts will not be countervailed if the collector of customs
is satisfied. This clarifies T.D. 49,821.

T.D. 49,870, 74 TREAS. DEC. 466 (1939): T.D. 49,809 is revoked on
direct shipments of Dutch meat.

T.D. 49,878, 74 TREAS.

DEC. 475 (1939): A form must be filed with
the collector of customs on all incoming German goods showing (1)
the route used and (2) the method of payment to determine if a
bounty has been given by barter.

T.D. 49,909, 75

12 (1939): Suspension of liquidation
of duty on silk goods from Italy is announced; a deposit will be
required pending estimate of bounty given. No explanation of
bounty's nature.
TREAS. DEC.

T.D. 49,932, 75 TREAS. DEC. 48 (1939): Duty on saltwater fish from
Nova Scotia is revoked. See T.D. 49,269 (1937) and T.D. 49,351
(1938).
T.D. 49,981, 75 TREAS. DEC. 119 (1939): Drawback on customs
duties in excess of import duty on British exported sugar is held
to be a bounty again. Rates given. See T.D. 49,355 (1938).
T.D. 49,998, 75 TREAS. DEC. 139 (1939): Free samples of German
merchandise will not be countervailed as per T.D. 49,821.

T.D. 50,093, 75

TREAS. DEC. 304 (1939): Cheeses 93 and 94 score
countervailed from Canada; no explanation.
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1940
T.D. 50,108, 75 TREAS. DEC. 328 (1940): New rates are announced
on British sugar. See T.D. 49,981 (1939).
T.D. 50,127, 75 TREAS. DEC. 362 (1940): Clarification of T.D.
50,108.
T.D. 50,148, 75 TREAS. DEC. 390 (1940): Exceptions to T.D. 49,909

(1939) are announced.
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A.
1940): German currency manipulation through free and registered
marks, convertible into dollars at differing rates and the latter not
freely alienable, constituted the bestowal of a bounty. T.D. 48, 360
(1936) is upheld.
V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354 (C.C.P.A. 1940):
Although very general and broad, T.D. 48,360 (1936) is sufficiently
precise to withstand two procedural attacks.
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
T.D. 51,371, 80 TREAS. DEC. 251 (1945): Due to changed circumstances, no duties will be collected pursuant to T.D. 48,360 (1936)
after May 8, 1945.
1946

T.D. 51,476, 81

TREAS. DEC. 115 (1946): Under the Wine Export
Bounty Act of 1939/40, bountified fortified Australian wine will be
assessed a countervailing duty.

Robert Miller Co. v. United States, 34 C.C.P.A. 101 (1946): In a
case analogous to Woolworth, buying German goods with cheap
aski marks constitutes a bounty. T.D. 48,360 (1936) is upheld.
John Heathcoat & Co. v. United States, 34 C.C.P.A. 122 (1946):
The word "fabrics" includes nets and nettings.
1947
T.D. 51,757, 82 TREAS. DEC. 237 (1947): Because of "payment of
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bounties by an agency of the Spanish Government," a countervailing duty is necessary on incoming cork.
1948
T.D. 51,876, 83 TREAS. DEC. 113 (1948): Because Spanish cork
subsidies have been discontinued as of November 1, 1947, T.D.
51,757 (which was issued on September 26, 1947) is modified to
include only shipments made before November 1.
T.D. 51,884, 83 TREAS. DEC. 126 (1948): Changed conditions in
Holland cause revocation of T.D. 49,741 (1938) as to chicory
shipped after May 9, 1945.
T.D. 52,074, 83 TREAS. DEC. 471 (1948): Shelled almonds from
Spain are countervailed at 6 pesetas per kilogram; no explanation.
1949
T.D. 52,350, 84 TREAS. DEC. 350 (1949): T.D. 39,722 (1923) is revoked, as Australia is no longer giving bounties for fencing wire,
galvanized sheets, or wire netting.

1950
T.D. 52,555, 85 TREAS. DEC. 244 (1950): Duties on British spirits
are revoked as of May 1, 1950, as Britain repealed bounty as of that
date. See T.D. 34,466 (1913) and T.D. 47,753 (1935).
T.D. 52,604, 85 TREAS. DEC. 325 (1950): T.D. 52,074 of October 12,
1948, is revoked as of November 12, 1948, since Spain discontinued
her bounty on almonds theretofore in effect on November 25, 1948.
T.D. 52,619, 85 TREAS. DEC. 341 (1950): Duties on Dutch milk, split
peas, and meat produce revoked. See T.D. 49,729 (1938), T.D.
47,658 (1935), and T.D. 49,809 (1939).
1951
1952
T.D. 52,923, 87 TREAS. DEC. 43 (1952): Since world sugar prices
now exceed Australian support prices, no bounty is currently being
paid; hence no duty will be assessed until world prices fall below
the Australian parity.

T.D. 53,182, 88 TREAS. DEC. 16 (1953): Canadian blue-veined
cheese is countervailed; no explanation.
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1953
T.D. 53,257, 88 TREAS. DEC. 105 (1953): A countervailing duty is

imposed of eighteen per cent on Uruguayan wool tops; no explanation.
T.D. 53,310, 88 TREAS. DEC. 177 (1953): T.D. 43,634 (1929), T.D.
44,742 (1931), T.D. 47,502 (1935), T.D. 47,594 (1935), T.D. 49,909
(1939) (duties on British and Italian silk articles), and T.D. 50,148
(1940) are all revoked. Additionally, T.D. 49,122 (1937) (duty on
Lithuanian butter) is revoked, as the country no longer exists.
1954
T.D. 53,446, 89 TREAS. DEC. 44 (1954): T.D. 53,257 (1953) concern-

ing Uruguayan wool tops is amended.
T.D. 53,476, 89 TREAS. DEC. 84 (1954): British silk again is countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 53,534, 89 TREAS. DEC. 153 (1954): "The Bureau has received
information concerning import of cordage to the United States
from Cuba which satisfies the Bureau that such imports receive

grants or bounties within the meaning of § 303." Duty set at 2.488
cents per pound.
1955
1956
1957
1958
T.D. 54,582, 93 TREAS. DEC. 151 (1958): The world price of sugar

has dipped below the Australian support parity; duty assessed.
T.D. 54,650, 93 TREAS. DEC. 331 (1958): T.D. 53,534 (1954) concerning Cuban cordage is amended to exclude baler and binder twine,
as these products get no bounty.
T.D. 54,719, 93 TREAS. DEC. 500 (1958): Australian sugar duty is
adjusted to match world market price. [Hereinafter Australian
sugar duties were amended every six months to adjust to world
prices. No citation will be given, as the decisions are all identical
except for the amount of duty assessed].
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1959
T.D. 54,792, 94 TREAS. DEC. 94 (1959): Countervailing duties are
assessed at eight pesetas per kilo on Spanish almonds; no explanation.
T.D. 54,798, 94 TREAS. DEC. 110 (1959): Wool tops which have been
registered with the Contralor de Exportaciones e Importaciones of
Uruguay do not get a bounty, hence T.D. 53,446 (1954) is superseded as to these tops.
1960
T.D. 55,023, 95 TREAS. DEC. 13 (1960): The British silk duty
promulgated in T.D. 53,476 (1954) is superseded with new rates.
T.D. 55,044, 95 TREAS. DEC. 56 (1960): The Uruguayan multiple
rates of exchange have been abolished, hence the duty on wool tops
promulgated in T.D. 54,798 (1959) is superseded and suspended for
shipments made after December 17, 1959.
T.D. 55,184, 95 TREAS. DEC. 355 (1960): The duty on almonds from
Spain in T.D. 54,792 (1954) is revoked by virtue of cessation of
bounty payments.
1961

T.D. 55,365, 96 TREAS. DEC. 141 (1961): As Australian payments
on fortified wines are not being and are not likely to be paid, the
duty set by T.D. 51,476 (1946) is revoked for all wine shipped after
May 31, 1955.
1962
T.D. 55,567, 97 TREAS. DEC. 56 (1962): As no bounties are or are
likely to be paid on British silk exports, T.D. 53,476 (1954) is
revoked as to all shipments after October 10, 1961.
1963
T.D. 55,812, 98 TREAS. DEC. 46 (1963): Whatever T.D. 52,555
(1950) left as a duty on British spirits, "Spirits sweetened in bond"
will be exempted from it.
Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust.
Ct. 1963): T.D. 53,257 (1953), which ordered countervailing duties
on Uruguayan wool tops, is valid as to both the existence of a
bounty and the amount of duty levied.
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1964
T.D. 56,312, 99 TREAS. DEC. 677 (1964): The duties remaining on
British silk from T.D. 55,567 (1962), on Uruguayan wool tops from
T.D. 55,044 (1960), and on Spanish almonds in T.D. 55,184 (1960)
are deleted from the countervailing duty list.
1965
1966
Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966):
T.D. 53,257 (1953) is reversed.
1967
T.D. 67-102, 1 CUST. BULL. 212 (1967): Steel units from Italy used
for electrical transmission towers are countervailed; no explanation. American Express Co., the importer, protests the assessment.
T.D. 67-219, 1 CUST. BULL. 452 (1967): A notice and comment
procedure is announced for future countervailing duty proceedings.
1968
T.D. 68-111, 2 CUST. BULL. 233 (1968): French canned tomato paste

is countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 68-112, 2 CUST. BULL. 235 (1968): Italian canned tomato paste
is countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 68-147, 2 CUST. BULL. 302 (1968): Canadian cheese order in
T.D. 50,093 (1939) and T.D. 53,182 (1952) is rescinded and superseded.

T.D. 68-149, 2 CUST. BULL. 329 (1968): Steel welded wire mesh from
Italy is countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 68-184, 2 CUST. BULL. 393 (1968): Section 16.24 of the customs
regulations is amended to provide that only products which actually receive bounties will be countervailed.
T.D. 68-192, 2 CUST. BULL. 409 (1968): A countervailing duty will
be assessed on all imports from France of 2.5 percent of the F.O.B.
price as a result of an export sales formula. The treasury reprints
the French decree.
T.D. 68-270, 2 CUST. BULL. 604 (1968): The French duty is dropped
to 1.25 percent.

Fall 19761

STEEL PRODUCTS DECISION

T.D. 68-288, 2 CUST. BULL. 637 (1968): Ski lifts from Italy are
countervailed; no explanation.
1969
T.D. 69-13, 3 CUST. BULL. 22 (1969): Duty rates on Italian canned
tomato paste are superseded with new rates. See T.D. 68-112.
T.D. 69-91, 3 CUST. BULL. 317 (1969): New duty rate for Italian ski
lifts is announced. See T.D. 68-288.
T.D. 69-113, 3 CUST. BULL. 357 (1969): Italian steel products are
countervailed; no explanation.
1970
T.D. 70-83, 4 CUST. BULL. 179 (1970): Duty rate on Italian tomato
paste is increased. See T.D. 69-13.
1971
T.D. 71-117, 118, 5 CUST. BULL. 225 (1971): Barley and molasses
from France are countervailed; no explanation.
United States v. Hammond Lead Products, 440 F.2d 1024
(C.C.P.A. 1971): The Customs Court lacked jurisdiction over the
case, because the allegedly damaged United States competitor
does not have standing to protest a negative bounty determination
by § 516(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970).
1972
T.D. 72-88, 6 CUST. BULL. 145 (1972): The Customs Service announces suspension of liquidation of duties on Grecian tomato
products pending ascertainment of the amount of bounty paid; no
explanation.
T.D. 72-122, 6 CUST. BULL. 231 (1972): Italian gas and air compressors are assessed a countervailing duty; no explanation.
T.D. 72-234, 6 CUST. BULL. 456 (1972): Bounties on canned tomato
products from Italy shipped direct to the United States have been
discontinued. T.D. 70-83 is modified so as to exclude the direct
shipments.
1973
T.D. 73-85, 7 CUST. BULL. 206 (1973): Italian refrigerators and
freezers are countervailed; no explanation.
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American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A.
1973): The absence of a direct relationship between the rebated
Italian excise taxes and the exported products constitutes a bounty
on Italian steel transmission towers. T.D. 67-102 is upheld.
1974
T.D. 74-65, 8 CUST. BULL. 118 (1974): Bounties paid on Grecian
tomato produce are ascertained, pursuant to T.D. 72-88.
National Milk ProducersFederationv. Schultz, 372 F. Supp. 745
(D.D.C. 1974): Milk producers have standing to get a hearing in
Federal Court so long as the Customs Courts will not take jurisdiction under the Hammond Doctrine.
T.D. 74-165, 8 CUST. BULL. 304 (1974): Italian die presses are countervailed.
T.D. 74-203, 8 CUST. BULL. 366 (1974): Conditional negative duty
determination on cut flowers from Columbia is announced. Since
"The Government of Columbia has taken action, effective July 17,
1974, however, to require such payments will not be made to the
producers of the merchandise but will remain within the sole con-

trol of the Government of Columbia by being paid instead to an
agency thereof," no bounty is found.
T.D. 74-218, 8 CUST. BULL. 394 (1974): Correction made in T.D. 7465 language.
T.D. 74-233, 8 CUST. BULL. 454 (1974): Rubber foot wear from
Brazil is countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 74-234, 8 CUST. BULL. 456 (1974): Bottled green olives from
Spain are countervailed; no explanation.
T.D. 74-235, 8 CUST. BULL. 257 (1974): Non-rubber footwear from
Spain is countervailed at 3 percent F.O.B.; no explanation.
T.D. 74-237, 8 CUST. BULL. 461 (1974): Michelin X-Radial Steel
Belted Tires from Canada are countervailed at 3.7 percent F.O.B.;
no explanation.
T.D. 74-254, 8 CUST. BULL. 490 (1974): Final notice of duty on
Michelin tires is announced. Duty is set at 6.7702 percent F.O.B.
1975
40 Fed. Reg. 6791 (1975): Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination on dairy products from the E.E.C. is announced. "On 27-75, the Commission of the European Community announced re-
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institution of export payments on certain dairy products destined
for the United States, which payments had been suspended since
7-12-74." Held, payments are being made, but amounts have not
yet been ascertained.
40 Fed. Reg. 5378 (1975): Notice of Preliminary Determination of
bounties paid on certain consumer electronic products from Japan
is announced. Offensive programs are described as (1) preferential
interest rate loans from the Japanese Development Bank, (2) promotional assistance from the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO), and (3) special tax deferrals under the Overseas
Market Development Program. Reports will be required from each
affected Japanese firm.
40 Fed. Reg. 6993 (1975): Preliminary Negative Duty Determination on Argentine Non-Rubber Footwear is announced. As of
December 23, 1974, the Argentine Government abolished the

bounty program.
40 Fed. Reg. 10698 (1975): Petition alleging bounties on dried apples from Italy withdrawn by petitioner.
40 Fed. Reg. 16119 (1975): Notice of petition received alleging
bounties paid on Philippine glazed ceramic tiles is annnounced.
40 Fed. Reg. 23899 (1975): Withdrawal of petitions alleging bounties paid on (1) steel produced in the E.E.C;, (2) German shoes,
and (3) woven tie fabrics from Japan, West Germany, and Korea.
T.D. 75-113, 9 CUST. BULL. 223 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 21719 (1975):
The Preliminary Determination made in 40 Fed. Reg. 6791 on
dairy produce from the European Community is finalized.
T.D. 75-114, 9 CUST. BULL. 229 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 21720 (1975):
"Re-suspension of duty" on European Community dairy produce
is announced pursuant to the Secretary's power to grant a four year
waiver of duty during negotiations.
40 Fed. Reg. 22007 (1975): Direct bounties are found on hard
cheese exports from Austria in a Preliminary Decision. Suspension
of liquidation of duty until final decision is announced.
40 Fed. Reg. 27498 (1975): Preliminary Determination finds that
bounties are given by European Community countries on canned
hams. Suspension of liquidations of duties until final decision is
announced.
40 Fed. Reg. 27498 (1975): Preliminary Determination finds that
bounties are being paid to South African ferrochrome exporters.
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Liquidation of duties is suspended pending determination of
amount until Final Determination.
40 Fed. Reg. 27499 (1975): German regional development programs
could amount to bounties on exports. Liquidation of duties is suspended on float glass until a final decision is made.
40 Fed. Reg. 27499 (1975): Preliminary Determination of grants
given to exporters of leather handbags from Brazil results in suspension of liquidation of duties until a Final Determination.
40 Fed. Reg. 27500 (1975): The Customs Service announces the
closing of its investigation of a Canadian oxygen sensing probe
manufacturer allegedly getting bounties, as it has ceased produc-

tion.
40 Fed. Reg. 28 (1975): A Preliminary Negative Duty Determination by the Service on Indian cast iron soil pipe and fittings finds
that export payments do not exceed the amount of indirect taxes
paid.
40 Fed. Reg. 28103 (1975): The Customs Service again finds no
cash payments or concessional prices have been given to Indian
fiber textiles.
40 Fed. Reg. 28103 (1975): Mexican steel preliminarily is determined to be bountified by reduced freight rates and corporate tax
exemptions. Rebate of ad valorem tax on goods related to the
excise held not to be a bounty. However, freight bounty and tax
exemptions are found de minimis and the Service preliminarily
finds no duty needed.
40 Fed. Reg. 28104 (1975): A Preliminary Determination that export certificates given by Mexico to her domestic growers worth 10
percent of the exported asparagus are bounties results in suspension of liquidation of duty until a Final Determination.
40 Fed. Reg. 28104 (1975): Preliminary Determination by the Service holds that investment grants, low interest loans, employment
premiums, exemptions from registration fees levied on increases of
assets, exemptions from real estate taxes, exemptions from local
taxes, and interest rate subsidies constitute bounties. Liquidation
of duty is suspended on Belgian float glass pending a Final Decision.
40 Fed. Reg. 28104 (1975): Direct payments to Swiss cheese producers to indemnify them for a year's export losses preliminarily is
held to be an export bounty; suspension of liquidation until Final
Decision.
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40 Fed. Reg. 28105 (1975): Accelerated depreciation and income
tax deferrals on Korean footwear are preliminarily determined to
be a bounty; suspension of liquidation until Final Decision.
40 Fed. Reg. 28105 (1975): The Customs Service preliminarily determines that no footwear producer from Taiwan is currently getting any bounty, as the local law only bountifies if all production
of a company is exported. But exporters will be countervailed if it
is later determined that they are getting export bounties.
T.D. 75-300, 9 CUST. BULL. 659 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 55638 (1975):
The Preliminary Determination of 40 Fed. Reg. 27498 (1975) that
European Community canned hams are bountified is finalized.
Article 15 of E.E.C. Regulation No. 121/67, giving restitution payments, comes within § 303 and will be countervailed.
T.D. 75-301, 9 CUST. BULL. 661 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 55638 (1975):
Waiver of duty on European Community canned hams is granted
as a result of a drop in the level of subsidy. Waiver will remain in
effect for four years during negotiations on the subject, so long as
(1) United States producers are not critically hurt, and (2) European hams are not aggressively marketed in the United States. See
T.D. 75-300.
1976
41 Fed. Reg. 782 (1976): A Preliminary Determination by the Customs Service finds that Sweden pays a bounty, a direct subsidy on
cheese exports. Suspension of liquidation of duties is announced
pending Final Determination.
41 Fed. Reg. 782 (1976): Notice of Final Duty Determination: No
bounty is being paid since the Argentine Government abolished
the bounty during the preliminary investigation.
T.D. 76-7, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 11 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1273
(1976): Carbon steel plate is held to be bountied by Mexico at a
rate more than the de minimis rate found in the Preliminary Determination. The Service announces suspension of liquidation of
duty pending ascertainment of dutiable amount. See 40 Fed. Reg.
28103 (1975).
T.D. 76-8, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 17 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1273
(1976): Waiver of Countervailing Duty Order is announced on steel
plate from Mexico up to four years during negotiations under § 102
of the Trade Act of 1974. See T.D. 76-7.
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T.D. 76-9, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 21 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1274
(1976): A Preliminary Determination that float glass from Italy
was made Final as to the one corporation receiving the benefits.
Another company was held not to be bountified. See 40 Fed. Reg.
28105 (1975).
T.D. 76-10, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 25 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1274
(1976): The Preliminary Determination that cheese from Austria
received an export bounty in 40 Fed. Reg. 22007 (1975) is Finalized.
T.D. 76-11, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 29 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1275
(1976): Waiver of Countervailing Order T.D. 76-10 on Austrian
cheese for up to four years during negotiations conducted under
authority of § 102 of the Trade Act of 1974 is announced.
41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976): Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination on Japanese Electronic Consumer Products: 40 Fed.
Reg. 5378 (1975), which preliminarily found bounties being paid,
was correct, but the bounties are found to be de minimis and not
dutiable.
41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976): Final Countervailing Duty Determination on ferrochrome from South Africa: The preferential freight
rates and foreign promotions were discontinued as of January 1,
1976, after the Preliminary Determination of 40 Fed. Reg. 34423.
Hence, no countervailing duty will be assessed.
41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976): Final Negative Duty Determination as
to footwear from Taiwan, 40 Fed. Reg. 34423, is Finalized.
41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976); Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: On receipt of further information concerning the
Mexican asparagus in 40 Fed. Reg. 28104 (1975), the Customs
Service is of the opinion that the rebate of a sales excise tax does
not constitute a bounty within the meaning of § 303.
41 Fed. Reg. 1299 (1976): Notice of Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination: The Belgian subsidies mentioned in 40 Fed.
Reg. 28104 (1975) were used for the development of depressed regions and amount to less than 2 percent of the price of float glass.
Therefore, they are not bounties and will not be countervailed.
41 Fed. Reg. 1300 (1976): Notice of Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination: The German subsidies mentioned in 40 Fed.
Reg. 21804 (1975) were used to channel investment to underdeveloped areas, and the float glass made there is almost all sold within
Germany. Therefore, the subsidies do not come within the meaning of § 303.
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T.D. 76-5, 10 CUST. BuLL. No. 3, at 1 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1467
(1976): Final Countervailing Duty Determination: The Preliminary Finding of a bounty on Swiss cheese in 40 Fed. Reg. 28104
(1975) is Finalized.

T.D. 76-6, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 7 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1468
(1976): Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Swiss Cheese: T.D. 765 is waived while negotiation procedures under § 102 of the Trade
Act of 1974 are followed.
T.D. 76-13, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 35 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1588
(1976): 40 Fed. Reg. 28105 (1975), which preliminarily found a
bounty given to Korean footwear exports, is Finalized.
T.D. 76-14, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 3, at 41 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1587
(1976): T.D. 76-13 is waived for a period of four years pursuant to
§ 102 of the Trade Act of 1974.
T.D. 76-3, 10 CUST. BULL. No. 2, at 21 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 1741
(1976): Final Determination of Countervailing Duties on Handbags from Brazil: 40 Fed. Reg. 27499 (1975) is Finalized.
41 Fed. Reg. 2834 (1976): United States Steel Corporation was
notified that its petition of September 18, 1975 contending that
V.A.T. in the E.E.C. was a bounty had been rejected on October
20, 1975. The Customs Service announces that United States Steel
has decided to appeal the Negative Duty Determination to the
Customs Court under § 516 of the Trade Act of 1974.

